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I. INTRODUCTION
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.1 and Kumho Tire
Co. v. Carmichael,2 the United States Supreme Court set the law of expert
testimony on a quest for “reliability.” These decisions, as well as the
subsequent amendment of Federal Rule of Evidence 702, make it clear that
trial judges are to perform a “gatekeeping” function, filtering out offered
testimony when the expertise on which it is based, whether scientific or
∗
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otherwise, is not reliable. Rule 702 now provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training,
or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise,
if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the
witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of
the case.3

Conditions (1)-(3) were added in 2000 in response to the teachings of
Daubert and Kumho Tire.
These developments have spawned a substantial literature.4 Little
attention has been given, however, to providing a careful analysis of the
contours and functions of the reliability concept itself and its relationship to
the purposes of admissibility rules.5 Daubert and Kumho Tire tell us what
kinds of factors to examine in order to determine whether or not proffered
expertise is reliable —factors such as whether or not the theory has been
tested empirically, and whether or not it has been subjected to the rigors of
peer review and public ation6 —and the 2000 amendment requires trial
courts to examine three different respects as to which the question of
reliability can be assessed. But these authorities say very little about what
is meant by reliability or exactly why an interest in reliability should be
manifested in the decision to exclude proffered evidence. In Daubert, for
example, the majority opinion states only that evidentiary reliability is
equivalent to “trustworthiness,” something presumably to be demanded,
and states this only in a footnote.7
Without a formula for the synthesis and use of the identified factors,
which the Supreme Court quite understandably eschews, one needs to
reflect on how the law of admissibility structures trials in order to
synthesize all the pertinent considerations into an overall reliabilit y
assessment that serves the law’s goals. This Essay undertakes such a
conceptual examination and explores at least some of its implications for
assessing the admissibility of expert testimony.
In Part II, I examine the most plausible understandings of the
3

FED . R. EVID. 702.
See generally DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., SCIENCE IN THE LAW : STANDARDS,
STATISTICS AND RESEARCH ISSUES 1-65 (2002).
5
Some sensible but brief comments are made in this regard by the current editors of
the McCormick treatise. See 1 M CCORMICK ON E VIDENCE § 203 (John W. Strong ed., 5th
ed. 1999). An unusually insightful analysis is given in the context of a recent proposal that
English law adopt a reliability-based exclusionary rule for criminal trials. See M IKE
REDMAYNE , EXPERT EVIDENCE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 116-39 (2001).
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reliability requirement, concluding that the best understanding is rather
different from the way it is commonly and even authoritatively expressed. 8
I argue that courts and commentators should disavow a binary, all-ornothing concept of reliability—that evidence is either reliable or
unreliable —in favor of a gradational concept—that the reliability of
evidence is a matter of degree. The apparently binary mode of expression
appearing in Rule 702 is misleadingly conclusory; it provides no analytical
framework for deciding how reliable is reliable enough.
In Part III, I develop some of the implications of that conclusion,
suggesting a framework for the courts to use in assessing reliability for the
purpose of an admissibility ruling. Not surprisingly, this involves weighing
the degree of reliability of the proffered expertise against the dangers that
might arise from admitting the expertise. But once this framework is
identified, important conclusions emerge. Primarily, I argue that concerns
about jury misuse of expertise are less m
i portant than concerns about
controlling advocates so as to provide the trier of fact, judge or jury, with
expertise that is as reliable as the circumstances of the litigation permit. I
suggest one set of ways to take this into account in a workable
interpretation of the reliability requirement in Rule 702.
To situate the present discussion, I should make an obvious but
important disclaimer: I do not assert that achieving a satisfactory or optimal
interpretation of the reliability requirement of Rule 702 is the most pressing
issue affecting the use of expert testimony. Various reform measures—
including greater use of court-appointed experts—may well be more
important to the administration of justice than the interpretive issue
discussed here.9 Implementation of such reforms might in turn affect the
analysis of Rule 702, but no attempt is made here to account for such
complications.
II. THE “RELIABILITY” REQUIREMENT: A CONCEPTUAL CRITIQUE
The Core Idea of Reliability. As suggested by the Supreme Court’s
cursory reference to “trustworthiness,” the concept of reliability entails a
justifiable willingness to rest decision, in some manner, on the thing
considered reliable. Reliability is inherently relative to a particular
decision context, and thus relative to the goal or purpose of decision. In the
context of the adjudicative legal norms announced in Daubert, Kumho Tire,

8
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and revised Rule 702, the decisions in question are verdicts, and the
principal goal in mind is the accuracy of those verdicts, within reasonable
constraints of time and cost.10 The core idea, then, is a concern for the
veritistic properties of offered expertise and, perforce, the rules that control
the admissibility of such expertise. By “veritistic” I mean the truth
producing quality of the expertise or the regulative rules, truth referring to
the factual accuracy of verdicts.11 Evidence, or the rules regulating
evidence, may be said to be more or less veritistic, more or less conducive
to accurate ve rdicts.
The requirement of reliability purports to be a veritistic regulation by
imposing some kind of supra-relevance veritistic constraint on expertise
that is introduced in court. These two ideas are not necessarily conjoined.
One could hold the view that the veritistically optimal regulatory scheme is
for courts not to concern themselves directly with the issue of reliability at
the admissibility decision. Sometimes, the best way to reach a goal is for a
particular decision-maker not to focus directly on the goal itself.
For example, if the conditions of Coase’s Theorem hold, then a
court’s decision on the content of the substantive law will not affect the
efficiency of the rule at issue, so long as the court provides a clear rule with
reference to which partie s are allowed to bargain; if the court did not strike
upon it, the parties will bargain to the efficient solution. 12 Under these
conditions, assuming that wealth maximization is the principal goal that the
court wants to achieve, the court should focus not on choosing the
allocation of entitlements that is more or most efficient, but rather on
choosing an allocation that is clear and, ceteris paribus, one that is just or
fair on non-efficiency grounds. A court’s attempt to go after efficiency
directly could well backfire if its ruling, trying to capture the elusive and
changing facts that conduce to efficiency, succeeds only in creating a rule
10

I consider later the possibility that accuracy of verdicts is not the goal relative to
which reliability is to be assessed. See infra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
11
The indicated conduciveness may be understood in the sense of justification or it may
be understood in causal terms. If certain evidence justifies an inference as accurate, then the
use of that evidence is causally conducive to accurate inference, unless the decision making
is irrational. Since the concern for irrational decision making (in the form of jury error) is a
recurring one in the law of evidence, the causal focus is more general and will be employed
here. In this I follow the work of epistemologist Alvin Goldman. See ALVIN I. GOLDMAN,
KNOWLEDGE IN A SOCIAL WORLD (1999). Although the implications of such a veritistic
social epistemology are controversial, the general approach is compatible with traditional
academic conceptions of the goals of evidence law. Compare Ronald J. Allen & Brian
Leiter, Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence, 87 VA . L. REV. 1491 (2001),
with Dale A. Nance, Naturalized Epistemology and the Critique of Evidence Theory, 87 VA .
L. REV. 1551 (2001).
12
Assuming that parties attempt to maximize wealth, the principal condition that must
be satisfied is that the transaction costs of rearranging entitlements must not exceed the
gains from trade. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & E CON. 1, 10 (1960).
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that is unclear, thus complicating the bargaining process.
Similarly, a justificatory premise of the adversary system is that the
clash of opposing, relevant evidence will yield accurate results, at least
frequently enough to render that system superior to the alternatives.13 To
the extent that the system is veritistically successful, it is due to confluence
of two factors. First, the system encourages parties to present all relevant
evidence that is reasonably available and not too weak to be of practical
use, each side in the dispute having an incentive to present that which is
significant and favorable.14 Second, the system provides a trier of fact
capable of shouldering the responsibility of determining what inferences
from the evidence are warranted. Accepting these premises, courts need
not ordinarily concern themselves with the details of reliability or
trustworthiness in deciding whether or not to admit evidence; they need
only exclude that which is irrelevant.15
Of course, many admissibility rules are based on perceived exceptions
to this general principle of adversarial veritism. In partic ular, both the
Supreme Court and Congress have decided that the proffer of expertise
should activate a decision process that looks beyond mere relevance, and
even beyond expert qualifications, to examine the reliability of the expert
testimony itself. But what exactly does that mean? And how can this be
implemented intelligently within an adversarial framework?
Alternative Forms of the Reliability Requirement. Authoritative
expressions of the reliability requirement, both judicial and statutory,
generally express the requirement in a dichotomous or binary fashion.
Proffered expertise is considered either reliable or unreliable; reliability, it
is implicitly assumed, does not come in degrees.16 In Daubert the Court
stated, “[U]nder the [Federal] Rules [of Evidence] the trial judge must
ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only
relevant, but reliable.”17 Extending this basic gatekeeping function to all

13
The locus classicus for this argument is Lon L. Fuller, The Adversary System, in
T ALKS ON AMERICAN LAW 30 (Harold J. Berman ed., 1961). The indicated premise need not
be that adversarial presentation of evidence is more accurate than alternatives, only that it is
not so much less accurate as to make it an inferior system all things considered.
14
The importance of having all relevant evidence is that it constitutes a well-known
condition on the validity of inductive inference, often called the principle of total evidence.
See, e.g., GOLDMAN , supra note 11, describing his non-categorical version as the “truth-inevidence principle,” articulated as follows: “A larger body of evidence is generally a better
indicator of the truth-value of a hypothesis than a smaller, contained body of evidence, as
long as all the evidence propositions are true and what they indicate is correctly
interpreted.” Id. at 145.
15
Accordingly, the default rules are that irrelevant evidence is inadmissible and that
relevant evidence is admissible. FED . R. E VID. 402.
16
See 1 M CCORMICK ON EVIDENCE , supra note 5, § 203, at 727.
17
509 U.S. at 589.
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specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702, the majority in
Kumho Tire opined, “The trial judge’s effort to assure that the specialized
testimony is reliable and relevant can help the jury evaluate [the expert’s]
foreign experience, whether the testimony reflects scientific, technical, or
other specia lized knowledge.”18 Not coincidentally, in each opinion the
reliability requirement is specifically coupled with the requirement of
relevance, which—under prevailing legal conceptions—is clearly
dichotomous: evidence is either relevant or irrelevant; it is not somewhat
relevant, very relevant, etc.19 Similarly, amended Rule 702 states that, to
be admitted, proffered expert testimony must be “the product of reliable
principles and methods,” applied “reliably to the facts of the case.” We are
thus encouraged to believe that testimony either is or is not the product of
reliable methods reliably applied.
The alternative way of expressing the requirement would be to say
that there must be a showing of “sufficient reliability” for admission. This
locution implies a concept of reliability that is gradational, a matter of
degree. It is suggested by references in Daubert to “the common law
insistence upon ‘the most reliable sources of information’,” 20 a locution
that presupposes reliability can be “more” or “less” as well as “most.” It
may also surface with the reference in Rule 702(1) to “sufficient facts and
data.” And it clearly emerges in the drafters comment on the revised rule
that numerous factors are relevant “in determining whether expert
testimony is sufficiently reliable to be considered by the trier of fact.”21 I
will argue that this conception of reliability is clearly superior, relative to
the task we ask courts to perform. This in turn accounts for the tendency of
some commentators, in restating the requirement articulated in Daubert,
Kumho Tire, and revised Rule 702, to slip into the “sufficient reliability”
formulation. 22
The problem, of course, with expressing the requirement in the latter
18

526 U.S. at 147-49 (quoted language appearing at 149).
This follows from the definition of relevance that is now widely accepted and
incorporated into the federal rules: “‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” FED . R. E VID.
401. Under the linguistic conventions of the federal rules, expressions like “somewhat
relevant” and “highly relevant” are simply imprecise ways of expressing something about
the probative value of the evidence, a notion that is clearly gradational. Probative value can
be low or high, very low or very high, etc. See Richard D. Friedman, A Close Look at
Probative Value, 66 B.U. L. REV. 733 (1986) (discussing formal measures of probative
value).
20
509 U.S. at 591 n.9, 592 (quoting FED . R. EVID. 602 advisory committee’s note)
(emphasis added).
21
FED . R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment (emphasis added).
22
See, e.g., Robert Epstein, Fingerprints Meet Daubert: The Myth of Fingerprint
“Science” is Revealed, 75 S. CAL . L. REV. 605, 617, 621 (2002).
19
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way, a problem that may explain why that locution is often avoided, is that,
without some reasonably determinate algorithm based on appropriate legal
norms that would specify what degree of reliability is “sufficient” for this
purpose, the requirement of sufficient reliability is vacuous. It tells us
almost nothing. 23 Using the dichotomous or binary form of expression
might conceal this gap by suggesting either that reliability is a
straightforwardly binary factual question, akin to the preliminary question
of whether a document offered in court is the original thereof,24 or that
there is some criterion of reliability that can be applied without directly
invoking such an algorithm. 25 If such suggestions are false, then what is
needed is a specification of not only the considerations that weigh against
admission of (assumedly) relevant expertise, but also some indication of
how to determine at what level of reliability these counterweights ought to
be controlling. The latter specification can be purposive (laying out the
purpose to be achieved and allowing the trial courts to pursue the goal) or
formulaic (providing a formula that can be employed without reference to
the purpose), or some of each. Despite the principal terminology used in
Daubert, Kumho Tire, and Rule 702, the new standard can be interpreted as
attempting, however confusingly and incompletely, such a hybrid
instruction.
In fact, we often acknowledge that dichotomous antecedents in legal
rules really reflect such weighing algorithms. Take the cause of action for
negligence. Expressed in dichotomous fashion, we have: if defendant was
negligent (and the other elements of the cause of action are present),
compensation should be paid; if defendant was not negligent, compensation
should not be paid (under a negligence theory). We all understand, do we
not, that “negligence” is a conclusion derived from some sort of
normatively informed risk algorithm, not an observable or discernible
fact.26 In the rule, “If defendant was negligent, compensation should be
paid,” the term “negligent” is simply a place-holder for such an algorithm;
it carries no independent force, except to alert us to the fact that the
referenced algorithm relates to the question of what degree of care is
socially demanded.
23

Of course, the mere fact that a requirement of “sufficient reliability” is posited by the
Court and Congress tells the trial courts that some decision about reliability should be made,
as opposed to none. This message, however, gives no guidance about how to make the
reliability determination.
24
See FED . R. E VID. 1001, 1002.
25
By using the term “algorithm,” I do not intend to connote quantification or
computational precision, merely an intelligibly complete specification of an analytical
framework or procedure, something more informative than simply an injunction to “solve
the problem.”
26
The algorithm might be a cost-benefit calculation a la Learned Hand, an elaboration
of a categorical imperative a la Kant, or yet some other idea.
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The dichotomous form of the reliability requirement could be meant,
or at least it could operate, in this way. If so, it is simply a less
transparently vacuous form of the “sufficient reliability” requirement.27
We accept that reliability comes in degrees, and are told implicitly that
there are reasons to exclude evidence even though it has more than de
minimis reliability. The requirement of reliability then says little more than
this: identify those reasons and decide whether they outweigh the law’s
default principle of admitting any evidence possessing probative value. In
such a scheme, the reliability requirement of Rule 702 is either redundant
of the balancing test of Rule 403,28 or it rather cryptically imposes
restrictions at least in some ways more demanding than Rule 403,
restrictions that need to be elucidated.
Reliability as Non-Binary. The Court in Daubert identified reliability,
in the context of scientific evidence, with scientific validity. 29 The nature
of the problem is thus illuminated by a digression relating to scientific
validity. A quick review of some of the Daubert factors demonstrates why
scientific validity is not easily understood in binary terms, except once
again as the expression of a conclusion relative to some particular task.
Consider the first “factor” adduced for the assessment of the reliability
of a purportedly scientific theory or technique: “whether it can be (and has
been) tested.”30 How much testing does it take before a principle or
technique can be said to have been “tested” for this purpose? Good
scientists know that replication of results is an important part of the
scientific method. Can, then, a principle or technique be considered
“tested” if only one test has ever been conducted? Two? Three? Does it
not depend on the quality of the tests as well as their quantity? If so, this
points to a concept of testing that is a matter of degree, more testing being
better than less, ceteris paribus, and testing that is more closely related to
the proposition of interest being better than testing that is more distant.31
27

Even before Daubert was decided, Professor Moenssens asserted the importance of
reliability assessments, using dichotomous reliability terminology, but then felt impelled to
recognize that such a concept of reliability is a conclusion, a “value judgment,” derived
from the weighing of legal norms. See Andre Moenssens, Admissibility of Scientific
Evidence—An Alternative to the Frye Rule, 25 WM. & M ARY L. REV. 545, 564-67 (1984).
28
FED . R. EVID. 403: “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.”
29
509 U.S. at 590 n.9 (“In a case involving scientific evidence, evidentiary reliability
will be based upon scientific validity”); id. at 592-93 (stating that the trial judge’s reliability
determination “entails a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology
underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or
methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue”).
30
Id. at 593.
31
See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 4, § 1-3.4.2[2], at 35 (“Only through replications,
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Similarly, if subjection to the demands of peer review and publication
is an important factor, as the Court opines,32 it should matter how rigorous
the peer review of a particular publication is, and that is surely a matter of
degree as to which not all publications are alike.33 Relatedly, although the
degree of acceptance of a principle or technique within a particular
community of experts is certainly pertinent to an assessment of the degree
of its reliability, little should turn on the artificial question of whether that
degree of acceptance has passed from just below to just over 50% of the
relevant community. Better is for courts to appreciate the degree of the
support in the relevant community in deciding what to do with the proffer
under some standard that does not make general acceptance a touchstone.34
Then there is the matter of “error rates.”35 How precisely must we
know the error rate of a particular technique? And what does one make of
a technique with a known, very high error rate? The rate may be known
with some precision, but that does not mean the technique gets a “yes”
answer to this component of the reliability inquiry. Rather, the question
must be transformed into one that inquires how large the known error rate
can be before the technique must be rejected by the courts as unhelpful.
That is a “How high is too high?” question, not a “Yes or no?” question. 36
The same is true for the maintenance of standards controlling a techniques
operation, considered as an indicium of reliability. 37
These quick observations could be multiplied easily. They point to a

using various designs and methods, do scientists gain confidence that a hypothesis has been
sufficiently corroborated. No magic number or moment determines this point, however; like
many areas of the law, science presents a broad spectrum of grays that over time sharpens
into black and white.”).
32
509 U.S. at 593-94.
33
See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 4, § 1-3.4.3 (noting variance in the status of journals
and the quality of peer reviews).
34
Indeed, the Daubert opinion does not state starkly that majority approval is
significant in and of itself, even as a “factor”; rather, quoting an earlier Third Circuit
opinion, it states,
A “reliability assessment does not require, although it does permit, explicit
identification of a relevant scientific community and an express
determination of a particular degree of acceptance within that community.”
Widespread acceptance can be an m
i portant factor in ruling particular
evidence admissible, and “a known technique which has been able to attract
only minimal support within the community,” may properly be viewed with
skepticism.
509 U.S. at 594 (internal citations omitted).
35
“[I]n the case of a particular scientific technique, the court ordinarily should consider
the known or potential rate of error” as a pertinent factor. Id.
36
See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 4, § 1-3.4.2[1], at 35 (noting that “any science that is
even slightly better than flipping a coin” is likely to meet the test of “assisting the trier of
fact,” so that Rule 702 “must embody, at least in part, a Rule 403 analysis”).
37
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.
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fact that scientists, at least sophisticated ones, surely understand: scientific
validity is not an all-or-nothing characteristic; rather, it is a matter of
degree.38 This proposition poses the question of how one gets from a
consideration of the degree of scientific validity to the undeniably binary
decision of whether or not to admit proffered testimony. Of course, the
same question is posed by the notion of validity as a synonym or proxy for
the reliability of non-scientific expertise. Thus, the fundamental problem is
how to map from a gradational epistemic conception of reliability to a
dichotomous legal choice on admissibility. The following sections
consider the options available for solving this problem.
Dichoto my by Deference. Perhaps the Supreme Court intended a
dichotomous reliability requirement that can be determined by reference to
more or less factual propositions about the standards of non-legal
institutions or their proper application, without the aid of a legal-policy
informed algorithm of the type described above. Indeed, there is much
language in Daubert that suggests this. As already noted, the Court’s
opinion identifies reliability, in the context of scientific evidence, with
scientific validity. That would appear to be a more or less factual (at least,
non-legal) inquiry into the application of standards of scientific inquiry
specified by the scientific community. 39 The well-known factors identified
in the Court’s opinion seem to have a similarly factual and deferential
character: Has the theory or principle been tested? Does it have a known
error rate? Has it been published and subjected to peer review? Has the
principle been applied according to standards developed by the scientific
community? Does it enjoy general acceptance among the relevant
scientific community? 40
To be sure, the Court made a point of refusing to provide a means of
determining how many “yes” answers to the five questions posed above are
required before reliability is established. And if, as I have argued above, it
makes little sense to talk in terms of looking for “yes” or “no” answers to
the questions posed by the Court’s enumerated factors, the problem of
38

FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 4, § 1-3.4, at 25 (“[A]s every scientist knows, validity is
not a categorical conclusion.”); KENNETH R. FOSTER & PETER W. HUBER, JUDGING SCIENCE :
SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND THE FEDERAL COURTS 17 (1999) (“‘Validity’ in science is not a
binary attribute, like pregnancy.”); Erica Beecher-Monas, A Ray of Light for Judges Blinded
by Science: Triers of Science and Intellectual Due Process, 33 GA . L. REV. 1047, 1062
(1999) (“The Supreme Court . . . failed to acknowledge that . . . scientific reliability is not an
all-or-nothing proposition, but rather depends on the application of the evidence and the
acceptable risk of error.”).
39
See Michael J. Saks, The Aftermath of Daubert: An Evolving Jurisprudence of Expert
Evidence, 40 JURIMETRICS J. 229, 231 (2000) (“The move from Frye to Daubert increases
judges’ gatekeeping duty by requiring them to evaluate claims of scientific expertise much
as scientists would.”).
40
See 509 U.S. at 593-94.
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synthesis is all the more difficult. This, however, is actually consistent
with the idea that the Court is deferring to the norms of the scientific
community: The Court has no particular skill for answering the synthetic
question ex ante; rather, it must be answered by investigation, more or less
the way a court in state X decides a question of law governed by the law of
state Y. In this case, however, state Y is the State of Science, a state with
no recognized supreme court. Moreover, because the Court acknowledged
that yet other questions might need to be answered, that other factors might
need to be considered, no fixed formula can be specified. The Court
understandably concedes the imperfections in its knowledge of, and thus its
ability to articulate ex ante, the validity laws of the State of Science.
Those familiar with admissibility standards in the mold of Frye v.
United States41 may quibble with my use of the term “deferential” to
describe this interpretation of Daubert’s reliability inquiry. Daubert, after
all, rejected Frye as a matter of statutory interpretation, and Frye
represented deference to the scientific community. 42 From a broader
perspective, however, Daubert might be understood as endorsing simply a
different kind of deference. Fyre mandated deference to the collective
opinion of scientists in the relevant field concerning the validity of the
proffered expertise. Daubert might be understood as mandating instead
deference to the norms of science, norms that must be applied directly by
trial and appellate judges, without accepting the collective opinion of
scientists as a conclusive proxy for validity. 43 This interpretation of
Daubert cannot be rejected simply because Daubert rejected Frye-type
deference.
Still, it is hard to believe that this non-Frye form of deference is
what the Court really intended, or would intend if it had clearly thought the
matter through. The obvious problem, one frequently noted, is that judges
must become junior scientists in order to try to apply the normative
standards of the scientific community. This is a task that some judges are
probably incapable of performing adequately, and one certainly that some
judges believe they are incapable of performing adequately. 44 It is
complicated by disagreement among scientists and philosophers of science
regarding the norms of scientific disciplines, disagreement of which there is
41

293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (applying a “general acceptance in the particular field”
test for novel scientific evidence).
42
See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585-89.
43
See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 4, § 1-3.0, at 13 (comparing Frye and Daubert).
44
See, e.g., Daubert, 509 U.S. 579, at 598-601 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting in part)
(casting doubt on the ability of judges to perform the contemplated task); Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1315-16 (9th Cir. 1995) (Kozinski, J., on remand,
bemoaning the Supreme Court’s “Brave New World” in which judges must decide whether
a qualified scientist’s testimony is “good science” “derived by the scientific method.”).
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barely a hint in the Court’s opinions.45 This difficulty, however real in
some cases, may be somewhat exaggerated. In many contexts of ordinary
science, it surely is possible for judges, with some assistance, to make
reasonable calls that would parallel those of good scientists who have not
lost their objectivity. 46
The more fundamental question is this: Why should the final
determination, reliable or not in court, be determined by the norms of the
scientific community instead of those of the legal community (other than
the legal norm of deference itself)? If the scientific community recognizes
scientific validity as a gradational, non-binary concept, as I think it does
and must, then that community must employ one or more normatively
informed, more or less determinate algorithms of its own for making any
categorical determinations of validity that it is called upon to make. These
norms will have developed to serve the interests of science or, more
precisely, the scientific community. 47 And if the scientific community
sometimes thinks of scientific validity as an all-or-nothing concept, it is
only because that community has developed dichotomous rules of thumb
that, while over- and under-inclusive in some cases, roughly serve to
further those interests. Why then should the scientific community’s
balancing of those interests, whether consciously and directly or indirectly
by the application of rules of thumb, be taken as controlling the conduct of
litigation?
Three initially plausible reasons can be identified, though each must
be rejected in the end. 48 First, it might be thought that the purposes and
goals of the scientific community are the same as those of the law of
adjudication, or at least so nearly the same that the difference is not worth
much concern. This supposed reason, however, is not likely to hold true in
the scientific context. To be sure, both disciplines place a high priority on
45

See generally David S. Caudill & Richard E. Redding, Junk Philosophy of Science?:
The Paradox of Expertise and Interdisciplinarity in Federal Courts, 57 WASH . & LEE L.
REV. 685 (2000).
46
See DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LEGAL ALCHEMY : T HE USE AND MISUSE OF SCIENCE IN THE
LAW 64 (1999) (“[M]ost judges are intelligent and well educated and there is no reason why
they cannot with diligence master the basics of the scientific method and statistical
theory.”).
47
I do not mean to imply that these interests are narrow or selfish, just that they are
accepted within the scientific community. On the other hand, that does not preclude the
possibility of significant rent-seeking, including the shaping of norms so as to augment
public funding of scientific research.
48
A fourth possible reason actually has considerable merit. It is based on the assertion
by the prop onent or its expert that the expertise is scientifically sound. This certainly
provides a reason to defer to scientific standards, at least as part of the analysis. This
reason, however, which depends on the precise claim being made by the proponent, is
readily accommodated within a framework that employs a gradational reliability concept
and a balancing test. See infra notes 185-93 and accompanying text.
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the ascertainment of truth by the application of relatively formal
procedures. But the parameters that give shape to this quest differ
noticeably: those of good adjudication include, for example, an emphasis
on promptness and finality of decision that is incompatible with the goals
of science, as Justice Bla ckmun himself observed pointedly in Daubert.49
For example, the law’s concession to unavoidable doubt often entails
an aversion to false negatives (e.g., refusing to impose civil liability on
defendant for want of proof of causation when its product did in fact cause
plaintiff’s injury) that is almost as strong as its aversion to false positives
(e.g., imposing liability when defendant’s product did not cause the
plaintiff’s injury).50 This trade-off is not reflected in the typical scientific
standards of hypothesis testing, themselves important norms of scientific
validity. 51 Thus, the conservative convention in social science that
(generally) insists on results that possess a statistical “p value” of less than
0.05 before a difference among one or more comparison groups will be
deemed “statistically significant” is an inferential norm that gives priority
to the avoidance of false positive conclusions. The idea is that, with a risk
of false positive conclusions greater than 5% were the “null hypothesis” of
“no difference” true, that hypothesis cannot safely be rejected. In that case,
scientists are prepared to leave the matter in limbo pending further study.
The law of trials, however, cannot so indefinitely postpone making a
judgment, but must rely on whatever evidence is reasonably available at the
time of decision. 52 Even in criminal cases, this difference is significant,
most conspicuously in assessing evidence offered by the accused.
These observations reflect the fact that the argument from identity of
goals is profoundly incomplete without an explanation of how legal
admissibility norms, which concern the helpfulness of information in
49

509 U.S. at 596-97.
Almost, but not quite. See Dale A. Nance, Civility and the Burden of Proof, 17
HARV. J.L & PUB. POL ’Y 647, 659-72 (1994) (arguing that a false positive verdict is more
serious than a false negative one whenever the former entails an imputation of serious
wrongdoing by the defendant but the latter does not entail an imputation of serious
wrongdoing by the plaintiff).
51
See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen, Expertise and the Daubert Decision, 84 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1157, 1164-67 (1994) (discussing this difference in the context of the
epidemiological evidence in Daubert); Margaret A. Berger, Upsetting the Balance Between
Adverse Interests: The Impact of the Supreme Court’s Trilogy on Expert Testimony in Toxic
Tort Litigation, 64 LAW & CONTEMP . PROBS. 289, 300-02 (2001) (emphasizing differences
between law’s assessment of causation and scientific assessments of causation); BeecherMonas, supra note 38, at 1099-1102 (same).
52
The point is carefully examined in Neil B. Cohen, The Gatekeeping Role in Civil
Litigation and the Abdication of Legal Values in Favor of Scientific Values, 33 SETON HALL
L. REV. 943 (2003); see also David H. Kaye, Statistical Significance and the Burden of
Persuasion, 46 LAW & CONTEMP . PROBS. 13 (1983) (explaining the complex relationship
between statistical significance and the burden of persuasion).
50
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reaching an accurate and final verdict on particular events in accordance
with the applicable burden of persuasion in an adversarial system, map to
scientific validity norms, which relate to the permissibility of scientists
deriving revisable conclusions about the general patterns of causation
drawn from data or information. While it is fairly safe to assume that such
scientifically well-grounded conclusions are going to be helpful in lawsuits
to which they are relevant, the converse cannot be safely assumed.
Scientific validity, as understood by scientists, should not be considered
necessary in all cases for adjudicative helpfulness.53
The second possible reason to defer in this way is more subtle. Even
if the criterion of sufficient reliability for conclusions in science is seriously
different from the theoretically appropriate criterion of sufficient reliability
for admissibility in adjudication, the law might choose to defer to the
scientific criterion simply to avoid controversy, to use a more determinate
scientific criterion in place of a more debatable legal criterion. This
argumentative candidate has at least a chance of success in the context of
scientific evidence, because portions of the scientific community have
standards of reliability that are reasonably determinate in some contexts.
Ultimately, however, it is unconvincing. The voluminous postDaubert litigation has shown that the new standards have hardly avoided
controversy. Relatedly, because of the significant difference between the
goals and purposes of the law and those of science, an inevitable tension
will arise in attempting to maintain this kind of deference. Courts will be
pulled to develop more pertinent legal standards, even in the face of
potential controversy about the content thereof. In any event, the failure of
such deference, to the extent based on this consideration, would be well
deserved. Avoiding controversy does not really concern the kind of costs
that properly should be balanced against our interest in accuracy. Rather, it
involves trading off (rather unsuccessfully at that) the goals of the law for
the convenience and comfort of judges and the rest of the polit ical
establishment.54
Perhaps, however, the avoidance of controversy is not really the point.
We can recast this into a third argument for deference if we are willing to
relax more candidly the assumption that accuracy of verdicts is the primary
53

See generally Peter Donnelly & Richard D. Friedman, DNA Database Searches and
the Legal Consumption of Scientific Evidence, 97 M ICH . L. REV. 931, 971-78 (1999) (noting
that the majority opinion in Daubert failed to realize the implications of its acknowledgment
of the differences between law and science).
54
Some kinds of costs obviously must constitute counterweights to the admission of
relevant evidence and indeed to the implementation of all rules that are veritistic in design.
There are limits to the amount of social resources that should be allocated to improving
accuracy of decision. The experience of controversy may be unsettling, but it is a cost we
expect judges to endure in the course of adjudicating disputes, at least if it cannot be
reduced without sacrificing accuracy.
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consideration with respect to which reliability is required. Suppose instead
that public confidence in verdicts is the primary consideration. 55 If so, then
a desire to create or maintain an undeserved public confidence that verdicts
reflect the certain truth might cause the Court and Congress to insist that
seemingly scientific experts testify only when their underlying expertise
meets some demanding standards employed in scientific investigation. In a
civil case involving a plaintiff’s offer of ostensible expertise that does not
meet the standards of science, the tortured thinking might run like this: If
the jury decides in favor of the plaintiff, and the public becomes aware (as
indeed the media will make sure they do) that some of the evidence in the
case was not up to scientific standards, then the public might believe that
the jury was duped into relying excessively upon that particular piece of
expertise (as indeed the defense will publicly assert). Thus, the public will
come to doubt the veracity of the jury’s verdict, even if that verdict is
entirely proper.
This, too, is ultimately unsatisfactory as a justification of deference,
even if the embedded behavioral assumptions are true. Within a broad
range of normal applications, public confidence in the law, though certainly
important, is a value that should remain subordinate (indeed,
lexicographically inferior) to accuracy of inference and decision in
accordance with the established burden of persuasion. Moreover, in the
long run, to sacrifice these goals for the sake of public confidence is likely
to endanger the very public confidence that is desired. Playing the public
confidence game can backfire once it becomes public that this is the game
being played. 56
Is the situation different for non-scientific expertise, what Rule 702
refers to as “technical or other specialized knowledge”? There are serious,
practical disciplines, such as clinical medicine, for which it can be said that
the parameters of decision, such as the priority given to accuracy,
promptness, and even finality, are more akin to those of adjudication than
are the pure sciences. We recognize this in myriad ways, such as the
important deference represented by the exception to the hearsay rule
contained within Rule 703, allowing expert opinions to be based on facts or
data that are not necessarily admissible if they are “of a type reasonably
relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions of
55

Cf. Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the
Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357 (1985) (arguing that many rules of
admissibility and sufficiency are attributable to an explicit or implicit policy of generating
verdicts acceptable to the public, whether accurate or not).
56
In the same way, the value of impartiality in the decision-maker should carry a higher
priority than the value, important as it is, of projecting an appearance of impartiality to the
public, and one of the best (though not infallible) means for maintaining the appearance of
impartiality is to maintain real impartiality.
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inferences upon the subject.”57 Although this provision facially does not
distinguish among different types of expertise, the conspicuous illustration
usually given to justify it is the physician making “life-and-death
decisions” based on hospital records, X-rays, and statements by the
patient’s relatives and other medical personnel. 58
On the other hand, there are countless forms of “specialized
knowledge,” ranging from astrology to plumbing, for which this is not true.
And some non-scientific disciplines, even some that have been regularly
employed in litigated cases for decades, have little or no extra-disciplinary
checks on reliability. 59 As recent debates have made clear, this may be
especially true for disciplines, such as handwriting identification, that have
been developed for, and find little application other than, forensic uses.60
To defer to the normative standards of reliability in such disciplines would
be to abdicate the basic gatekeeping function. 61 As a general strategy,
therefore, deference to the reliability norms of non-legal institutions is no
more plausible in the context of non-scientific expertise than it is with
regard to scientific expertise.
The law of admissibility might attempt to tailor this discipline by
discipline, deferring only to those non-legal institutional norm systems that
generate reliability standards fairly close to those that law’s normative,
policy-based prescriptions would yield directly. But why go to this
trouble? It would, after all, require the same non-deferential assessment
that, under a more generally non-deferential approach, would have to be
done directly, except that it would be attempted over whole classes of
expertise. Moreover, to use a deferential standard for some categories of
expertise and a non-deferential standard for others would require a kind of
disciplinary line-drawing that was rejected in Kumho Tire. Affirming the
applicability of the reliability standard to all kinds of expertise, whether or
57

FED . R. EVID. 703.
FED . R. EVID. 703 advisory committee’s note (distinguishing as impermissible the
case of an accidentologist relying on reports of bystanders who observed an accident).
59
Even in a context like conventional medicine, there may be good reasons to doubt the
reliability of decision making; a nominal concern for accuracy, promptness, and finality that
is similar to the law’s may not in fact translate into a degree of reliability that the law should
consider appropriate for the resolution of disputes. See, e.g., John M. Eisenberg, What Does
Evidence Mean? Can the Law and Medicine Be Reconciled?, 26 J. HEALTH POL ., POL ’Y &
L. 369, 369-70 (2001) (“[T]here is sufficient evidence to suggest that most clinicians’
practices do not reflect the principles of evidence-based medicine but rather are based on
tradition, their most recent experience, what they learned years ago in medical school, or
what they have heard from their friends.”).
60
See Michael J. Saks, Merlin and Solomon: Lessons from the Law’s Formative
Encounters with Forensic Identification Science, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1069, 1091 (1998).
61
This, of course, is not to say that the degree to which a proposed expert follows the
normative standards of his or her own discipline is irrelevant to a reliability assessment.
Significant divergence is a red flag suggesting bias and calls for explanation.
58

2003

ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERTS

207

not commonly regarded as “scientific,” the majority rightly opined that,
while the factors that might be useful is assessing reliability should vary
with context, no distinction between science and non-science can be
doctrinally justified or practicably maintained. 62 The same constraints
prevent us from using a deferential, dichotomous reliability concept for
some non-scientific expertise but not others.
Indeed, Kumho Tire represents the end of the deferential regime that
Daubert might seem to have put in place, notwithstanding the emphasis
placed on professional standards.63 When Daubert tied reliability (for
scientific evidence) to the idea of scientific validity and suggested factors
that might be taken into account in assessing validity, the opinion left
unclear whether the judiciary should use those factors because the
judgment of (hypothetical) good scientists is determinative, or rather
because those factors are generally useful tools for reaching a legal-policy
based assessment of validity that may or may not accord with what
scientific norms would require. Kumho Tire appears to have resolved this
question: “[A] trial court should consider the specific factors identified in
Daubert where they are reasonable measures of the reliability of the expert
testimony.”64 What is “reasonable,” in turn, is a matter of legal policy, not
scientific policy. 65 Kumho Tire thus frees Daubert to allow that there is an
important analytical difference, even in the context of scientific evidence,
between legal norms of reliability and norms of validity or reliability that
inform the inference processes in any non-legal discipline that is invoked in
testimony. 66
Dichotomy without Deference. Having rejected deference, we should
consider whether it is possible to maintain such a dichotomous reliability
62

Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 147-49.
See id. at 152 (indicating that one purpose of the reliability requirement is to assure
that an expert employs “the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of
an expert in the relevant field”); see supra note 61.
64
Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152.
65
Cf. FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 4, § 1-3.5.1, at 43 (“Whether the basis for a proffered
expert opinion is valid depends on what that opinion is, and what consequences follow from
it. This is a matter of policy, not science.”).
66
I am not suggesting any extreme post-modernism, any wholly social construction of
truth. I present no challenge to the philosophically conventional thrust of the reliability
factors identified by the Supreme Court and lower courts or the essentially veritistic aims
associated with them. Of course, what is taken as true after a trial, the verdict upon which
legal action is taken, is certainly a proposition that might diverge from what, on purely
epistemic grounds, one ought to believe to be true, if for no other reason than the fact that
considerable relevant evidence is privileged and thus removed from consideration. That
does not alter the fact that the primary objective of the trial is veritistic, looking to the
accurate application of substantive law to probable adjudicative facts. See JOHN RAWLS, A
T HEORY OF JUSTICE 85 (1971) (“The theory of trials examines which procedures and rules of
evidence, and the like, are best calculated to advance this purpose consistent with the other
ends of the law.”).
63
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concept without invoking sub silentio a policy-based balancing formula
that renders the supposedly binary determination simply a report of the
conclusion obtained by such balancing. Is there a way to map facts,
including non-legal institutional facts, to such a dichotomous legal
determination of reliability? The answer is certainly, “Yes,” but again it is
very hard to find a workable formulation that is compatible with
established doctrine and institutional capacities.
What exactly are we looking for here? One possibility is a binary
factual determination the satisfaction of which, by the consequent
admission of evidence, can be expected to improve verdict accuracy. A
direct approach would have courts make assessments of the overall
propensity of certain evidence to yield accurate verdicts. That is, proffered
expertise would be considered reliable if its admission has the propensity to
produce more accurate verdicts, in all cases or at least in cases of this
type.67 Alternatively, the suggestion might be that judges should assess
directly whether admission will achieve the proper balance between the
risk of false positive verdicts and the risk of false negative verdicts.68
These suggestions are problematic, however, if they assume that the judge,
in making admissibility rulings, uses knowledge of the truth about the
disputed material facts. The reliability inquiry should not lead to a practice
of using admissibility to engineer what the trial judge believes to be the
right verdict. On the other hand, such suggestions presumably mean
something more demanding than simply the exclusion of expertise that
does not assist the trier of fact. 69 If, then, the indicated suggestions are to
occupy the precarious middle ground between these two conceptions of the
judicial role, can they work? I think not, for they suffer from even more
daunting practical difficulties than the deferential approach.
The difficulty already noted—that judges under Daubert must become
surrogate experts in the relevant field—is thereby compounded by a
different problem. Now the greater problem is that judges in each context
67

Analogously, speaking about the evaluation of social practices in terms of the
accuracy of its user’s beliefs (the beliefs’ “veritistic value” or “V-value”), Professor
Goldman writes:
Suppose the range of pertinent applications of the practice has been settled.
Theoretically, then, we can take the average (mean) performance of the
practice across those applications as a measure of its V-value. If on average
the practice increases the V-values of the user’s belief states, the practice has
positive V-value. If on average it decreases the V-values of the user’s belief
states, the practice has negative V-value. And if on average it leaves the Vvalues of the beliefs unchanged, the V-value of the practice is neutral.
GOLDMAN , supra note 11, at 92.
68
See David L. Faigman, Expert Evidence in Flatland: The Geometry of a World
Without Scientific Culture, 34 SETON HALL L. RE V. 266-67 (2003).
69
The idea of assisting the trier of fact to perform its factfinding task is addressed in
Part III, infra.
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would have to become a special kind of expert, predic ting the impact of
alleged expertise (of whatever species) on the adjudication of disputes. In
the vast majority of contexts, moreover, this would have to be done without
the benefit of extant social science regarding the behavior of triers of fact.
For example, more so than having to become an expert in DNA
technology in order to evaluate some new genetic evidence technique, the
judge would have to become trained in the analysis of the impact of the
new technique on juries, presumably as indicated by the social science of
similar or related techniques, if any exist. Without such knowledge, the
judiciary would have to proceed based on the collective prejudices of the
legal profession as they are passed from generation to generation. Suffice
it to say, the perspicacity of the latter has been shown to be seriously
wanting. 70
And there are further problems. In this context, the determination of
reliability likely will be dependent on the meaning given to “cases of this
type.”71 Depending on the range of potential applic ations (admissions) of
the contemplated expertise, it might be reliable or unreliable. Nor is this
problem avoided by the emphasis in Kumho Tire on addressing reliability
not in the abstract but rather in regard to the “task at hand.”72
Commentators have noted that this appears to require not a global focus but
a local one; reliability must be established relative to the particular
inference the expert is being called upon to make.73 There is an undeniable
element of truth here, but pressed to its logical conclusion, this would make
determinations of reliability all but impossible, for the particular task at
hand in a lawsuit is never replicated in research. Trials, and the issues that
they present, are unique events. In order to make any assessment of
reliability of a claimed expertise, one must address the veritistic propensity
of such testimony, the evidence for which is inherently statistical, based on
experienced frequencies over some class of cases. Of course, the “task at
hand” should not be understood too broadly—and certainly some courts
have been guilty of such untailored analysis—but even with appropriate
sharpening of focus, at the margin there may remain enough play in the
70
Outside the area of experts, empirical research has shown that professional
expectations about jury behavior are often wide of the mark. See, e.g., Shari Diamond &
Neal Vidmar, Jury Room Ruminations on Forbidden Topics, 87 VA . L. REV. 1857 (2001)
(reporting results of observations of jury deliberations in regard to discussion of insurance);
Peter Meine et al., Juror Decision Making and the Evaluation of Hearsay Evidence, 76
M INN . L. REV. 683 (1992) (reporting results of mock jury studies in regard to hearsay
evidence). On professional expectations of jurors in regard to expert testimony, see
discussion infra, notes 128-46 and accompanying text.
71
See supra text accompanying note 67.
72
526 U.S. at 141 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597).
73
See, e.g., D. Michael Risinger, Defining the “Task at Hand”: Non-Science Forensic
Science After Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 57 WASH . & LEE L. REV. 767 (2000).
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joints that veritistic propensities can be manipulated by task selection.
These problems might be avoided if the courts were to employ a
reliability test that is less epistemically demanding for judges. Many rules
of admissibility that do not concern experts provide models of what this
might look like. Consider the rule excluding hearsay. That rule does not
provide that, when confronted with evidence of a statement not made on
the stand in the current trial, the trial judge should consider designated
factors, such as the absence of cross-examination of the declarant, and
weigh these against the probative value of such evidence in order to decide
admissibility. Nor does it say, more elliptically, that the trial judge should
simply weigh all competing factors, without specification of what those
might be. Instead, it requires categorically the exclusion of such a
statement when offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, if it does
not come within one of the (for the most part equally) factually binary
exceptions.74 In other words, these dichotomous tests encapsulate, or so it
is hoped, the goals of the adjudicative law, the most important of which in
this context is verdict accuracy, but without requiring, at least in the
ordinary case, any advertence to those goals or the ba lance of competing
considerations that relate thereto. Indeed, this in many ways is the essence
of rule-governed decision-making. 75
In this vein, one might select one or more dichotomous proxies for
reliability, each of which tests for one particular and important way in
which reliability can be undermined. If the expertise is not undermined in
one of these specific ways, the expertise satisfies the reliability
requirement. Such a proxy test, if well or fortuitously designed or evolved,
might not be too over-inclusive or under-inclusive for practical use.
Superficially, this might look like the scheme that the Supreme Court
initiated with Daubert, its “factors” constituting the proxies. Such a
scheme cannot, however, create an intelligible dichotomous standard of
reliability, unless either (a) only a single, dichotomous proxy is used, so
that the expertise would be deemed “reliable” relative to the present
requirement provided the single proxy test is passed, or (b) in the multiple
proxy context, one has a determinate way of synthesizing the results of
those tests or factor applications into a single, binary judgment without
performing an independent assessment of reliability. Pretty clearly,
Daubert does neither. Its factors cannot yield simple “yes” or “no”
answers; its formulation rejects any single factor as determinative; the
opinion expressly leaves open the possibility of additional pertinent factors;
and a fortiori it eschews any reasonably determinate means of synthesizing
74

See FED . R. E VID. art. VIII.
See generally FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL
EXAMINATION OF RULE -BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (1991).
75
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the various factors to be considered. 76
Of course, the Court’s reticence does not necessarily mean that no
such reasonably determinate synthesis is possible, and at least one eminent
evidence scholar has attempted to provide such a synthesis by listing binary
conditions for a determination of reliability. Edward Imwinkelried
suggests filling out the requirement in the following way, at least for
scientific evidence:
[T]here is “enough” validation when the proponent’s foundation
establishes that an hypothesis has been verified by an empirical study
which: (1) is based on a large, representative database; (2) was
conducted under conditions approximating those in the instant case;
and (3) yielded a validity rate justifying the definiteness of the tendered
opinion.77

Like amended Rule 702, this suggestion identifies certain areas of interest
on which trial judges should focus. That is certainly helpful, as far as it
goes, but it soon throws up difficult questions: How large a database is
large enough? How representative must it be to support this opinion? How
close is close enough for the conditions to approximate those of the
litigated case? How high a “validity rate” is high enough to justify an
opinion of a given definiteness? These questions cannot be understood as
binary questions of the type we are seeking here. They can only be
answered by assessing what is at risk given the degree to which these
parameters are not satisfied in the proponent’s evidence. And this means
that the criteria stated reflect, at best, conclusions of an analysis that
implicitly invokes an unspecified weighing algorithm. 78
What else might we try? We might be more modest in the goals that a
dichotomous reliability concept is expected to achie ve. Perhaps all that is

76
See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-95; see also Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 149-52 (also
emphasizing ex ante flexibility).
77
See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Should the Courts Incorporate a Best Evidence Rule
Into the Standard Determining the Admissibility of Scientific Testimony?: Enough is Enough
Even When It is Not the Best, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 19, 50 (1999).
78
The idea might be that some kind of invisible hand mechanism, say the accumulating
experience of judges, will allow the intuitive balancing of competing considerations without
an explicit process of identifying the counterweights. This seems to be the underlying,
perhaps unintended, idea in an earlier article by Professor Imwinkelried, from which he
drew the test here quoted. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Judge as Daubert Gatekeeper:
Adapting Old Maps to the Unfamiliar Terrain of the “Brave New World,” PROCEEDINGS OF
THE 1999 N ATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SCIENCE AND THE LAW 46 (1999), at
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/nij/179630.pdf (categorizing admissibility rulings according
to an analogy with the burden of production on the merits). But it is hard to discern the
mechanism that would produce a desirable convergence of rulings, especially in the rapidly
changing arena of expert testimony, without explicit attention to the counterweights that
determine, once the degree of reliability is assessed, how reliable is reliable enough to
warrant jury consideration in the context of the case.
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necessary in the context of an admissibility decision is the elimination of
expertise that is unreliable in certain specific ways that are amenable to
dichotomous tests. For example, drawing on the first articulated Daubert
factor, suppose the gatekeeping role consisted solely of determining
whether the basis for an opinion is testable. An expert in prayer is offered
to testify that God revealed to him during prayer that the defendant is
guilty. God also revealed during the same prayer that God will not reveal
anything else to the expert, certainly not anything that can be independently
confirmed. In such a context, the expert may be excluded on the ground
that the basis for his testimony is untestable. Use of the other Daubert
factors, suitably developed, could similarly eliminate supposed expertise
that is defective in particular ways.79
This might be developed into a coherent admissibility scheme,80 but it
is definitely not what Daubert mandated. For Daubert did not simply
require the exclusion of expertise that is defective in one or more of several
specified ways. It mandated that only reliable expertise be admitted.
Admission under Daubert, in its dichotomous reliability interpretation, thus
involves a judicial determination that the expertise is reliable, not one that
the expertise has not been found to be unreliable in designated respects.
Expertise that is unreliable (or very unreliable, to put it in gradational
terms), but not in one of the articulated ways, should not come in under
Daubert, but would come in under the contemplated scheme. The two
frameworks are not compatible.
The Downside of Dichotomy. Faced with the very difficult task of
coming up with a coherent scheme of dichotomous reliability that is
faithful to the mandates of the Supreme Court and Congress, there is some
tendency for trial judges to try instead to answer a different, more readily
answerable, but clearly dichotomous question. Courts might, for example,
treat the admissibility decision as a sufficiency decision on the merits,
excluding the proffered expertise unless it possesses sufficient reliability to
meet the burden of production, at least to the extent the proponent bears
such a burden. With exclusion of such evidence often resulting in
summary judgment or directed verdict, it is tempting to treat the
79
Cf. 1 M CCORMICK ON EVIDENCE , supra note 5, at 736 n.65 (arguing that the Daubert
reliability requirement might be read to exclude only “‘subjective belief or unsupported
speculation’ and ‘inference[s] or assertion[s] [not] derived by the scientific method,’”
leaving any further oversight to be carried on pursuant to a general balancing of probative
value and counterweights, presumably via Rule 403) (citation omitted).
80
Such an approach would, in fact, bear some similarity to the work of philosopher Karl
Popper, upon whom the Daubert Court confusingly relied. See Susan Haack, An
Epistemologist in the Bramble-Bush: At the Supreme Court with Mr. Joiner, 26 J. HEALTH
POL ., POL ’Y & L. 217, 230-32 (2001) (criticizing Daubert’s reliance on Popper, noting that
under Popper’s philosophy of science, a claim or theory cannot be known to be true or even
probable, but can only be “corroborated” by failures to falsify it).
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admissibility question as determined by the answer to the sufficiency
question. Indeed, there is good reason to think this sort of thing is
occurring. 81
Treating reliability as a dichotomous characteristic of expert
testimony thus reinforces a pre-Daubert trend: What some courts really
have wanted to do in certain toxic tort litigation is to rule on the merits
against the plaintiff; for want of suitable doctrinal means of so doing
directly, they struck upon the idea of excluding the plaintiff’s critical
evidence and then granting the defense summary judgment.82 As Sam
Gross has emphasized, it may well be important to facilitate explicit
preemptive determinations on the merits by judges in cases for which the
scientific evidence is overwhelmingly one-sided, but the entrenchment of a
reliability-based admissibility regime is not the right way to achieve this
goal. 83 Here, as elsewhere, the distinction between admissibility and
sufficiency should be kept clear in order to avoid confusion, mistaken
rulings, and the improper use of precedents.84
Deciding sufficiency in the guise of admissibility might or might not
yield the same results that would occur if the admissibility and sufficiency
determinations were kept properly distinct. For example, in deciding
whether to admit one expert opinion or set of opinions under such a
sufficiency standard, if no other evidence favoring the proponent on the
disputed fact is considered, such a procedure places an artificially high
burden on the proffered expertise. It is not clear what grounds can be
81
Judge Kozinski’s ruling on remand in Daubert illustrates it nicely. 43 F.3d 1311, at
1320-22 (applying the reliability test in light of California law on sufficiency of the
evidence); see also Beecher-Monas, supra note 38, at 1073-74 (arguing that Daubert has
contributed to the confusion in this regard); Berger, supra note 51, at 304-06 (discussing
rulings excluding expert testimony in toxic tort cases when based on studies showing a
relative risk of less than 2); id. at 322-25 (discussing doctrinal aspects of a conflation of
admissibility with sufficiency). Certain statements in Daubert and Kumho Tire do
encourage this. See Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 153 (apparently endorsing the trial court’s
assessment that the challenged expert testimony “fell outside the range where experts might
reasonably differ, and where the jury must decide among the conflicting views of different
experts, even though the evidence is ‘shaky.’ Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596.”).
82
See Samuel R. Gross, Substance & Form in Scientific Evidence: What Daubert Didn’t
Do, in REFORMING THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM 234, 246-48 (Larry Kramer ed., 1996). “As
the Bendectin cases illustrate, courts do not like to admit evidence and say it’s insufficient.
Instead, they will go to unfortunate lengths to find that essential parts are inadmissible, and
then say that there’s not enough left to go to the jury.” Id. at 252.
83
Id. at 255-61. Gross identifies part of the problem as the conventional but poorly
reasoned principle of the law of sufficiency that the opinion of any qualified expert is
sufficient to sustain a verdict coinciding with the opinion. This principle erroneously treats
expert opinion as if it were just another form of direct evidence, whereas in fact it is a form
of expert-assisted circumstantial inference. Id. at 252-53.
84
See, e.g., Dale A. Nance, Conditional Relevance Reinterpreted, 70 B.U. L. REV. 447,
449-59 (1990) (discussing confusion of admissibility with sufficiency that has helped to
spawn the perverse doctrine of conditional relevance).
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offered for requiring that the expert testimony be enough by itself to sustain
the burden. Even if all other favorable expert evidence on that disputed
fact is considered in making the sufficiency-imbued admissibility
determination, the proponent may still be disadvantaged by not having the
benefit of all non-expert evidence relating thereto. 85
Moreover, even if the trial court considers all evidence in the case on
the material issue in question (including that which the proponent is yet to
introduce), the reliability requirement still amounts to the multiplication of
events that trigger a summary determination, unless the admissibility of all
the proponent’s expertise is decided in a single pre-trial hearing.
Otherwise, with each item of expertise offered on the issue by a party
bearing the burden of production, the opponent gets, in effect, an
opportunity to move for summary judgment. With more bites at the apple,
so to speak, such a procedure entails more cumulative probability of
summary determination, as well as more expense incurred by a proponent
who, in some cases, will be at a sizeable resource disadvantage. It is
unclear whether effectively increasing the burden of production is an
intended or appropriate consequence, but no justification for doing so only
in the presence of expert testimony has been provided. 86
Finally, the reliability requirement must be applied to parties not
bearing a burden of production; Rule 702 does not distinguish on this
ground. The obvious example is expertise offered by a criminal defendant
to negate the prosecution’s affirmative case. If, however, the same
methodology is applied by analogy to such parties, then their evidence may
be subjected to artificially high admissibility hurdles. Why, that is, should
relevant expert testimony, unlike other evidence offered by an accused, be
excluded simply because it is not enough to raise a reasonable doubt?
Worse yet, why should it be excluded just because similar evidence was not
85
Replying to criticisms of the conflation of admissibility with sufficiency, Professor
Mueller argues that there is nothing wrong with excluding evidence because it is insufficient
to meet the burden of production, provided the proponent has an adequate opportunity to
advise the court about all additional evidence that may be forthcoming on the issue.
Christopher B. Mueller, Daubert Asks the Right Questions: Now Appellate Courts Should
Help Find the Right Answers, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 987, 1001 (2003) (citing cases that
illustrate such a practice). This, of course, assumes that the court is willing to consider all
such evidence, expert and non-expert, in making its supposed admissibility ruling.
86
In addition, sufficiency rulings are subject to de novo appellate review, while many
admissibility rulings—including reliability determinations under Daubert—are subject to
review only for abuse of discretion. See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 4, § 1-3.6 (arguing,
however, that some reliability related issues should be considered de novo). Burying a
sufficiency ruling within an admissibility ruling may thus have the effect of insulating the
former from proper appellate review. Cf. John J. Gibbons, Tenth Anniversary of the
Supreme Court’s Decision, Daubert v. Merrell Dow, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 127 (2003)
(discussing confusion in the review of admissibility rulings when they are part of a summary
or directed judgment).
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enough to warrant a finding by a preponderance of the evidence in some
civil case that is cited by analogy, or because it was not enough to warrant
a finding beyond reasonable doubt when offered by the prosecution in a
criminal precedent? This can be expected once these precedents are
transmuted from sufficiency rulings into admissibility rulings.
Even worse possibilities exist. In their search for a manageable
dichotomy to substitute for a determination of sufficient reliability, courts
may try instead to determine which expert’s testimony on a particular
matter, the plaintiff’s or the defendant’s, is based on more reliable
information, excluding the loser in this comparative evaluation. 87 Such a
decision starts with a gradational conception of reliability but then
transposes it into a binary one by way of the comparison. It also amounts
to a decision on the merits by the trial judge.88 The same is true if courts
presume to think non-comparatively by excluding alleged expertise that the
court believes is simply incorrect, or if they try to decide which side should
win and then admit or exclude evidence based on its propensity to produce
the “right” result. These various substitute decisions may be exactly what
some interest groups would like to see by way of tort reform, but they are
dangerous substitutions if the right to a jury trial is to be preserved, indeed
if the right to a trial is to be preserved at all. 89
Reliability and Related Gradational Attributes. Yet there is a germ of
insight in such substitute approaches. Many of the problems associated
with a binary reliability regime can be avoided if we think in terms of
comparative evaluation rather than isolated evaluation of reliability,
provided the proper comparison is made. As with the use of analogies in
substantive law, one can sometimes answer the comparative question more
easily or more coherently than the isolated one.90 Instead of asking
87

See Beecher-Monas, supra note footnote 38, at 1073 n.151 (asserting that this
confusion may occur). Once again, language can be found in Kumho Tire that would
encourage this kind of thinking. See 526 U.S. at 155 (comparing the challenged expert’s
report on certain foundational facts, concerning the remaining tire tread, with testimony by
opposing experts).
88
This possibility necessitated warnings from the drafters of the 2000 amendment:
“When a trial court, applying this amendment, rules that an expert’s testimony is reliable,
this does not necessarily mean that contradictory expert testimony is unreliable. The
amendment is broad enough to permit testimony that is the product of competing principles
or methods in the same field of expertise.” See FED . R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s
note to 2000 Amendments. The drafters did not, however, go on to explain in what sense of
“reliable” this idea can be maintained.
89
See Richard D. Friedman, Squeezing Daubert Out of the Picture, 33 SETON HALL L.
REV. 1047, 1057 (2003) (stating that “a fair definition . . . is that an item of evidence is
reliable proof of a phenomenon if the existence of the evidence indicates a high probability
that the phenomenon is true” and arguing that under such a conception of reliability, “[t]he
whole notion of a trial, and indeed the whole purpose of the factfinder, falls away if we say
that a given piece of evidence can be presented to the factfinder only if it is reliable”).
90
Cf. GOLDMAN , supra note 11, at 92 (indicating the advantages of comparative
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whether a given item or type of proffered expertise is, relative to the
suitably defined task at hand, reliable vel non (the isolated sense), or
whether it is more reliable than that offered by the opponent (appropriately
a question for the trier of fact), we might better ask whether a given item or
type of proffered expertise is, in the context, more or less reliable than
some alternative presentation by that party, including the possibility of
simply dropping the challenged expertise from the evidentiary mix.
To take advantage of the comparative evaluation of potential evidence
packages, however, requires an acknowledgment of the different mode of
thinking about reliability itself, for it depends, as already noted, on the
ability to say that one package is more reliable or less reliable than
another, which implicitly accepts that reliability is a matter of degree, like
“probative value” and “credibility.” In Part III, I will suggest ways to
incorporate explicitly the gradational conception of reliability into the law
of admissibility. In so doing, I hope to further indicate that a gradational
reliability concept is not only more appealing theoretically, but also more
workable in practice.
Before doing so, however, we should pause to note that the exact
relationships among reliability, credibility, and probative value, as these
terms are used in the federal rules, are unclear. Common usage is vague,
and the terms are not authoritatively defined. For example, expert
credibility might be viewed as simply part of what determines expert
reliability, or credibility of the expert might be distinguished from the
reliability of the expertise itself.91 The latter formulation would reserve
credibility assessments for the trier of fact by limiting reliability assessment
under Rule 702 to matters unrelated to witness credibility. That might be
desirable, but the oft-expressed concern about bias among experts suggests
that the effects of bias must be taken into account in applying the reliability
screening mandated by the rule.92
Similarly, reliability might be considered one component of probative
value, or the two might be considered distinct. As a theoretical matter, it
has been suggested that the probative value of an item of evidence be
identified with its likelihood ratio relative to the contending hypotheses in

veritistic evaluation of social practices).
91
See, e.g., BERNARD ROBERTSON & G.A. VIGNAUX, INTERPRETING E VIDENCE :
EVALUATING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 7-8 (1995) (noting that the term
reliability is variously used to refer to test sensitivity, quality control, discriminatory power,
or witness honesty).
92
Bias seems to be a major concern, for example, when courts making re liability
assessments take into account whether experts are “proposing to testify about matters
growing naturally and directly out of research they have conducted independent of the
litigation, or whether they have developed their opinions expressly for purposes of
testifying.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1995).
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the case.93 If so, then one might also identify reliability, or rather
unreliability, as a measure of the extent to which evidence causes
divergence between the subjective likelihood ratio of the trier of fact and
(some measure of) the objective likelihood ratio that the trier ought to
attribute to that evidence.94 The greater that divergence, the lower the
reliability. 95 This suggestion seems to limit unreliability to a certain
tendency to mislead. 96 But this misses an important point: evidence that is
not misleading at all, at least in the indicated sense, can nonetheless be
considered to have weak reliability; it may have a degree of unreliability
that is perfectly well understood by the decision maker and thus reflected in
its assessment of probative value. As I will argue below, focusing
exclusively on the tendency to mislead the trier of fact, at least in the sense
expressed in the suggested measure, gives the wrong focus to the reliability
concern in the context of expert testimony.
For the purpose of developing a workable interpretation of Rule 702,
therefore, it would be unwise to adopt a narrow and theoretically specific
formalization of reliability. Instead, we should work with its unrefined—
but gradational—meaning, indicating a degree of dependability or
trustworthiness.97 In comparative terms, one item of evidence is more
reliable than another if the former is more dependable or trustworthy. 98
93

In general terms, the likelihood ratio for evidence, E, is the probability that such
evidence would be presented under the hypothesis of guilt (or liability), P(E|G), divided by
the probability such evidence would be presented under the hypothesis of innocence (or
non-liability), P(E|not-G). It is a measure of the relative consistency of the evidence with
the two contending hypotheses. See Richard Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 M ICH . L.
REV. 1021, 1023-24 (1977).
94
For an interesting analysis of the idea of “objective” likelihood ratios, see Alvin I
Goldman, Quasi-Objective Bayesianism and Legal Evidence, 42 JURIMETRICS J. 237 (2002).
95
See REDMAYNE , supra note 5, at 118-20 (building on the work of philosopher Alvin
Goldman).
96
Redmayne discusses various problems with this model of reliability. See id. at 12024.
97
Cf. id. at 118 (“I think the common use of the term does have a coherent, if
unarticulated, meaning, which treats ‘reliable’ as a synonym of ‘dependable’ or
‘trustworthy.’”).
98
Professor Imwinkelried, in his comment on a draft of this Essay, chides me for not
providing a specific definition of reliability. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Relativity of
Reliability, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 269, 282-83 (2003). To be sure, I believe that my claim
that the reliability concept in Rule 702 is better interpreted as gradational rather than as
binary (which is not the same thing as saying that it should be understood as “relative” to
the inferential task at hand, though this is also true, see id. at 285) can be demonstrated
without providing a canonical definition of reliability. Indeed, providing such a definition is
not the role of someone offering an interpretation of an authoritative term. Such definition
must be given by the courts or by Congress. In interpreting the rule, what commentators
may do is to investigate or refine meaning, not to prescribe it. Nevertheless, in response to
Imwinkelried’s understandable query, the best that I am currently able to do in this regard is
to offer the following comparative conception as an interpretation of what I think lawmakers
might be groping toward: E1 is more reliable than E2, as evidence regarding proposition X,
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III. TOWARD A P OLICY-BASED BALANCING FRAMEWORK
In order to determine whether a differential in reliability warrants
exclusion of the less reliable, it is crucial to look not only to the factors that
affect the degree of reliability—factors that have been explored extensively
in the extant literature—but also to the factors that would warrant the
exclusion of relevant but insufficiently reliable evidence.
One
commentator has written:
[C]ourts and commentators have identified the varied considerations
that determine the balance of probative value and prejudice of scientific
evidence. Applying these to various types of scientific evidence offers
a more honest and sensitive basis for making admissibility decisions
than the more cramped tests that have characterized this area of the law
of evidence.99

This assertion is, I think, largely correct, except that courts and
commentators so far have done a much better job of identifying “the varied
considerations that determine . . . probative value” than of examining the
factors related to “prejudice” that would inform the indicated balance. The
latter is a major source of our continuing problems in understanding the
reliability requirement. How then shall we complete the analysis in such a
way as to give due respect to the teachings of the Supreme Court and the
mandate of Congress in amended Rule 702?
Avoiding Blind Alleys. Start by noting what should not be done. It
does not help, and it might hurt, to invoke the notion of a “threshold of
reliability,” above which expertise is considered acceptable in court and
below which it is not. Unfortunately, prominent scholars—even some who
disagree significantly about other aspects of expert testimony—often agree,
explicitly or implicitly, that the post-Daubert regime rightly requires
expertise to exceed such a threshold of reliability. 100 Of course, if this
if and only if, without regard to whether either item of evidence favors X or not-X, but
assuming (even if it is not true) that one favors X while the other favors not-X, a rational
person required to wager on the truth of the proposition favored by E1 or that favored by E2
would bet on that which is favored by E1. The hypothetical veil of ignorance—deciding
which evidence is worth the bet without regard to which side of the dispute it favors—
represents the core of good sense of the statement in Daubert that “the focus, of course,
must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.”
509 U.S. at 595. I cannot say that anything in my argument in the text depends on the
precise terms of this definition, but it may give the reader a better idea of what I have in
mind. Or not. Professor Imwinkelried’s call for a definition may actually have been
intended as a call for a formula with which to compute a real-valued measure of reliability.
Obviously, I make no attempt to provide such a formula.
99
1 M CCORMICK ON EVIDENCE , supra note 5, at 737 (footnote omitted).
100
Compare, e.g., Imwinkelried, supra note 77, at 42-45 (not explicitly using the
“threshold” terminology, but arguing that “when the question posed is the sufficiency of a
foundation [for an expert opinion], the issue is whether the foundation is adequate to support
the specific opinion proffered, not whether the expert has relied on the best scientific
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mode of expression is understood simply as a metaphor for the use of
another analytical framework, such as that of Rule 403, then it poses little
danger, provided that framework is clearly identified. 101 Yet, there are
reasons to be skeptical of its employment even as metaphor.
One serious problem with this method of transforming continuous
variation into dichotomous choice is that it suggests, although it does not
explicitly require, an invariant threshold that applies across disciplines and
across litigation contexts. The mental picture is an ascending scale of
reliability with a mark that separates the insufficiently reliable from the
sufficiently reliable. The suggestion is that the location of this mark on the
scale, as distinguished from the question of whether the particular evidence
exceeds the threshold it indicates, is identifiable, at least in principle,
without an appreciation of either the nature and type of expertise or the
alternatives to it that may exist in the context of a particular case. This
pernicious idea is essentially a resurrection, in the limited context of expert
testimony, of the now-discredited “plus-value” requirement that Wigmore
described for all evidence.102 The idea is misleading in that it suggests that
expertise can be determined to be “sufficiently reliable” by considering
only the degree of reliability, without considering the particular
counterweights that cut against admission in context.
Indeed, even without the imagery of the uniform minimum that makes
the threshold imagery appealing, it remains vacuous. It merely restates the
“sufficient reliability” idea without telling us anything affirmative about
how to fill it out. Without more, one is left to suppose that the significance
of the (unidentified) counterweights can be assessed by macroscopic
gestalt, rather like identifying pornography by the “I know it when I see it”
test.103 The same would be true of unadorned exhortations to admit only

technique available”), with David L. Faigman, et al., How Good is Good Enough?: Expert
Evidence Under Daubert and Kumho, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 645, 659, 664-65 (2000)
(arguing for the use of a “better evidence” principle, but acknowledging the idea that the
post-Daubert regime requires “a minimal threshold of reliability”).
101
Professor Faigman, in his comment on this paper, disclaims any suggestion that the
idea of a “minimum threshold of reliability” can suffice to do the work of mapping
gradational reliability into the dichotomous decision on admissibility, but he nonetheless
argues that Daubert requires “some minimal amount of testing.” The only explanation that
he provides for this, however, involves an example (prediction by “tarot cards, tea leaves
and crystal balls”) that surely would result in exclusion under Rule 403 without any help
from Rule 702. See Faigman, supra note 68, at 259. Perhaps, then, the invocation of a
“minimum threshold” by Faigman et al., supra note 100, is really just an assertion that Rule
403 excludes purported expertise that is so weakly probative as to be a waste of time. If so,
I would agree, but that does not speak to the interpretation of Rule 702.
102
See 1A JOHN H. WIGMORE , EVIDENCE IN T RIALS AT COMMON LAW § 28 (Tillers rev.
1983).
103
The quote is from Justice Stewart’s famous concurring opinion in Jacobellis v. Ohio,
378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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that which is “reasonably reliable,” although this locution is less likely to
call for the ni visible marker imagery. Without giving attention to the
parameters in the balance that determine whether a given degree of
reliability is reasonable for admission, any such formulation effectively
requires the judge to answer the question: “Does the degree of reliability of
the expertise outweigh?” Unless something follows the word “outweigh,”
the question is practically incoherent. Outweigh what?
Michael Graham’s interesting attempt to resolve the reliability puzzle
is instructive in this regard. 104
Professor Graham identifies two
interpretations of the reliability requirement that struggle for recognition in
the courts and that illustrate dichotomous and gradational conceptions of
reliability, although he does not use this terminology.105 The first
interpretation would require trial courts to determine “whether the
[expert’s] explanative theory . . . produces a correct, accurate, truthful,
valid conclusion.”106 Under the second interpretation, trial courts would
determine “whether there are sufficient assurances present . . . that the
expert witness’s explanative theory produces an accurate result to warrant
jury acceptance.” 107 The first interpretation, which Graham rightly rejects
as too demanding of experts and of courts,108 instantiates the dichotomous
approach. Graham argues for the second interpretation as more within
judicial capacities and better suited to the “‘liberal thrust’ to admissibility
of expert witness testimony that was favored by Daubert.”109 In doing so,
he sometimes explicitly uses language that accepts the gradational nature of
reliability. 110
Now, to ask whether there are sufficient assurances of accuracy to
warrant jury acceptance (rather than jury consideration) of the expert’s
opinion or information appears on its face to fall into the trap already noted
of conflating admissibility with sufficiency. 111 But the matter becomes less
clear once one examines the details of such a determination as conceived
by Graham. An expert’s testimony would pass his test if either the expert’s
theory “has gained widespread acceptance in the particular field to which it
belongs,” 112 or (if neither widely accepted nor widely rejected113 ) it
104
See Michael Graham, The Expert Witness Predicament: Determining “Reliable”
Under the Gatekeeping Test of Daubert, Kumho, and Proposed Amended Rule 702 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, 54 U. M IAMI L. REV. 317 (2000).
105
Id. at 336-39.
106
Id. at 317.
107
Id. at 317, 339.
108
Id. at 356.
109
Id. at 356-57.
110
E.g., Graham, supra note 104 , at 341 n.62.
111
See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
112
Graham, supra note 104, at 340.
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“possesses particularized earmarks of trustworthiness.”114 The first prong
of this test seems to resurrect, modify, and extend the applicability of Frye,
which may or may not be a good idea.115 However that may be, the idea of
demanding, in default of such widespread consensus, only “particularized
earmarks of trustworthiness” is as incomplete here as it is in the law of
hearsay and confrontation, from which it is presumably drawn. 116 If not
understood as simply instrumentally related to a sufficiency ruling on the
merits, itself problematic once again, this idea is just another way of
articulating the essentially vacuous notion of a “threshold of reliability.”
And the problem remains: expertise cannot be known to pass a threshold—
from insufficiently reliable to sufficiently reliable —just by identifying
particularized earmarks of trustworthiness, no matter what they are or how
many of them are accumulated. Something is necessarily missing from
such an analysis; one must know, in some sense, where the threshold is in
order to know whether it has been passed. Few would doubt the relevance
of some such earmarks—presumably along the lines of the Daubert
opinion and subsequent elaborations thereof—in the assessment of
reliability, but once again that assessment constitutes only one side of the
balance that needs to be considered in order to make an appropriate
admissibility decision.
The blind alley into which conventional analysis has wandered is
nicely illustrated by a treatise statement made in the context of discussing
the role of Rule 403 in screening expert testimony for reliability:
Under Rules 702 and 104(a), judges must decide whether the proponent
of scientific evidence has demonstrated the validity of the scientific
basis for the testimony by a preponderance of the evidence. In many
cases, however, while judges might find scientific evidence to be
“valid,” they might believe that it is not valid enough, in light of the
dangers associated with its use.117

I do not take issue with this statement as a description of prevailing
113

Id. at 346.
Id. at 340.
115
Graham acknowledges that “reliance on ‘widespread acceptance’ is subject to the
limitation that the entire field to which the explanative theory belongs does not itself simply
‘lack[ ] reliability’.” Id. n.61. This suggests that the widespread acceptance idea is
instrumentally related to, and therefore subject to being trumped by, other considerations in
regard to what is ultimately a sufficiency determination.
116
The idea of looking for particular indications of “trustworthiness”—Justice
Blackmun’s synonym of choice for reliability (see supra note 7 and accompanying text)—is
also prominent in the law of hearsay and the prevailing constitutionalization of hearsay in
the confrontation clause. On the inadequacy of this lore, see Richard D. Friedman, Truth
and its Rivals in the Law of Hearsay and Confrontation, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 545 (1999). See
also Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles, 86 GEO . L.J.
1011 (1998).
117
FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 4, § 1-3.8, at 59-60.
114
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conceptions. My problem concerns those conceptions. While it is certainly
true that Rule 403 serves as a residual exclusionary principle that is
analytically distinct from Rule 702, the point of the discussion in Part II is
that conventional understandings of Rule 702 do not allow for any usable,
non-balancing, rule -like criterion to which Rule 403 can serve in such a
capacity. Consequently, it makes no sense to say that the validity
determination can be meaningfully separated from a consideration of the
“dangers associated with [the evidence’s] use.” Once again, the binary
conception of reliability suggested by the reference to a demonstration of
validity “by a preponderance of the evidence” tends to conceal this
problem.
Connecting Reliability to Counterweights. How, then, can we
articulate a more coherent balancing analysis that gives explicit attention to
the counterweights? In fact, we can draw on a rich body of theory about
the rationale of admissibility rules, for many such rules attempt to answer,
in particular contexts, whether evidence of a certain type is sufficiently
reliable to be admitted. 118 As I have detailed elsewhere, these rules respond
to one or more of three basic concerns: (1) that the trier of fact is prone to
err in its assessment of the probative value of certain types of evidence or
in its application of the burden of persuasion when faced with such
evidence (concerns that are expressed primarily in regard to jury trials); (2)
that the offered item of evidence will be of too little probative value to
warrant the necessary expenditure of time and resources, including the
cognitive resources of the trier of fact, necessary to incorporate it into the
decision-making process (generally of concern in both jury and bench
trials); and (3) that the trier of fact (judge or jury) should not be forced to
assess the case based on the offered evidence when superior evidence is
likely to be available.119
The first two concerns lead to an admissibility structure that prefers
the exclusion of the challenged evidence ceteris paribus, that is, all other
evidence in the case being (hypothetically) the same. They differ in that
the first entails a much larger degree of epistemic paternalism than the
second. The third concern, however, leads to an exclusionary structure that
prefers the replacement of the offered evidence with something else, better
evidence. It reflects more the problem of advocate control than the
118

A similar strategy is employed, to somewhat different effect, in REDMAYNE, supra
note 5. Redmayne argues that “it is inconsistent for the English legal system to apply
reliability-based exclusionary rules to hearsay and confession evidence, while not applying
one to expert evidence.” Id. at 126.
119
See Nance, supra note 11, at 1554-60. The analysis sets aside rules, such as those
privileging certain confidential communications against disclosure, that rest largely on nonveritistic concerns relating to incentives for conduct, or the protection of relationships,
outside the courtroom.
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problem of jury control that tends to animate the first concern. Jury
credulity, after all, is not the only potential source of inaccuracy in
adjudicatio n. Even in a bench trial, the court will want the best evidence
reasonably available.120 Indeed, even in a trial by a panel of experts, were
one to be undertaken, the panel would want such evidence.121
Assuming that we are to deploy a sensitivity to these traditional
concerns to interpret a “sufficient reliability” requirement, is there anything
general and affirmative that one can say about how such an analysis should
proceed? A few parameters frame the discussion to come. We are looking
for an analysis that assumes testimony by a qualified expert that is relevant
to a disputed issue and specifies an additional requirement related to
reliability. The strategy is to develop the implications of a gradational
reliability concept in the context of each of the three concerns articulated
above. We want a standard, or set of standards, that is responsive to the
concerns articulated above but not simply redundant of Rule 403. 122 This
presupposes that the Supreme Court did not simply intend to deliver the
message that trial courts have been improperly applying Rule 403 in the
context of expert testimony. More importantly, it reflects the general
consensus that Daubert did not adopt the position advanced most
conspicuously by Dean McCormick, well before the adoption of the federal
rules, that would treat relevant testimony by a qualified expert in a way no
different from most other kinds of evidence the admissibility of which is
challenged, subjecting it to the standard balancing of probative value
against competing concerns now reflected in Rule 403. 123
120

Id. In a series of articles, I have argued at length that the third concern is more
pronounced in the legitimate rationales of admissibility rules than conventionally thought.
See, e.g., Dale A. Nance, A Theory of Verbal Completeness, 80 IOWA L. REV. 825 (1995);
Nance, Conditional Relevance Reinterpreted, supra note 84; Dale A. Nance, Understanding
Responses to Hearsay: An Extension of the Comparative Analysis, 76 M INN. L. REV. 459
(1992). The most general treatment is Dale A. Nance, The Best Evidence Principle, 73
IOWA L. REV. 227 (1988) [hereinafter The Best Evidence Principle].
121
Of course, a trier of fact can try to make allowances for the absence of evidence, but
this is a second best solution as compared to having the better evidence before the tribunal.
See Dale A. Nance, Evidential Completeness and the Burden of Proof, 49 HASTINGS. L.J.
621, 633-39 (1998) (examining reasons not to rely upon jury discounting to handle problems
of evidential incompleteness).
122
A familiar principle of statutory construction is that a body of rules should be
interpreted so as not to render any one thereof wholly redundant of the others and therefore
pointless. See 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND’S STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 46:06 (6th ed. 2000).
123
For McCormick’s view, see CHARLES T. M CCORMICK , HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE 363 (1954), in which McCormick criticized Frye as more appropriately a test for
taking judicial notice. He wrote, “Any relevant conclusions which are supported by a
qualified expert witness should be received unless there are other reasons for exclusion.
Particularly, its probative value may be overborne by the familiar dangers of prejudicing or
misleading the jury, unfair surprise and undue consumption of time.” Id. at 363-64. On
Daubert’s rejection of the McCormick view, see Paul C. Giannelli, Daubert: Interpreting
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Nevertheless, because all three types of concerns identified above can
be addressed by an analysis under Rule 403, and because analysis under
that rule is at least reasonably well understood, it is possible to use that rule
as a starting point in developing the kind of analysis needed for Rule 702.
Indeed, one norm clearly serves to distinguish the contemplated balancing
test under Rule 702 from ba lancing under Rule 403. Under 403, the burden
is on the objecting party to convince the trial judge that the testimony’s
probative value is outweighed by the indicated risks.124 In contrast, it is
generally agreed that the burden is on the proponent of expertise to
establish (sufficient) reliability under 702. 125 One might leave it at that,
switching the allocation of the burden but otherwise understanding the 702
reliability decision as a replication of the 403 balancing test.126 That
approach would certainly simplify the problem of articulating a coherent
reliability test under Rule 702. 127 For reasons explained below, however, I
believe it is less than optimal.
Offsetting Jury Credulity. Both before and after Daubert, what has
often been stated as the primary concern warranting the exclusion of
proffered expertise of dubious reliability is the idea that a lay jury will be
misled by such evidence, giving it greater credence than it deserves.128
the Federal Rules of Evidence, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1999, 2009-12 (1994), explaining that
Daubert is more demanding than the standard Rule 403 analysis. See also 1 M CCORMICK
ON EVIDENCE , supra note 5, § 203 (comparing Frye and Daubert with McCormick’s
preferred standard).
124
Nominally, Rule 403 authorizes exclusion only when probative value is “substantially
outweighed” by one of the indicated concerns. This presents a puzzle: How can it be that
we should refrain from excluding evidence the probative value of which is outweighed by a
concern, but not substantially outweighed by it? If the probative value is outweighed by the
concern, then the evidence should be excluded, should it not? What else could it mean to
say that it is “outweighed”? This puzzle afflicts all Rule 403 jurisprudence, and the answer
must be this: “substantially outweighed” is a sloppy locution intended to mean “clearly
outweighed,” so that doubts about the balance of probative value and counterweights are
resolved in favor of the prop onent. This seems to be how courts interpret the rule. See
CHRISTOPHER B. M UELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK , E VIDENCE § 4.9, at 190 (2d ed. 1999).
125
See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 4, § 1-3.1.2.
126
This is the solution favored by my colleague, Calvin Sharpe, in his comment on this
Essay. See Calvin W. Sharpe, Reliability Under Rule 702: A Specialized Application of 403,
34 SETON HALL L. REV. 289, 307 (2003).
127
This approach would provide something resembling a “minimum threshold of
reliability” at least theoretically distinguishable from Rule 403. See supra note 101. Unlike
the abstract use of that phrase, however, the present suggestion (a) identifies the
counterweights that are to be assessed in context, and (b) requires a weighing of the
probative value of the evidence, as affected by the degree of its reliability, against the
identified counterweights.
128
Pre-Daubert: see, e.g., Edward J. Imwinkelried, Judge Versus Jury: Who Should
Decide Questions of Preliminary Facts Conditioning the Admissibility of Scientific
Evidence?, 25 WM. & M ARY L. REV. 577, 580 (1984); Moenssens, supra note 27, at 564-67.
Post-Daubert: see, e.g., Donnelly & Friedman, supra note 53, at 974; Graham, supra note
104, at 356; Clifton T. Hutchinson & Danny S. Ashby, Daubert v. Merrell Dow
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This might seem to follow from one of the defining characteristics of
expertise, that jurors lack specialized information available to the expert. It
coheres with suspicions about the credibility of experts for hire, if it is
thought that jurors are unable to discount for the effects of bias. As is well
known, Daubert itself was decided within a climate of concern over jury
credulity in the face of junk science.129
This view of the matter has led to perceptive criticisms of the Court’s
solution to the problem. For example, Susan Haack poses the troubling
rhetorical question: “[I]f judges need to act as gatekeepers to exclude
scientific evidence which doesn’t meet minimal standards of warrant
because juries may be taken in by flimsy scie ntific evidence, how realistic
is it to expect juries to discriminate the better from the worse among the
half-way decent?” 130 Such criticis ms carry undeniable force if juror
credulity is the source of the Court’s concern. 131
Strikingly, however, the majority opinion in Daubert was at pains to
disavow any serious skepticism about jury competence, opining that it is
“overly pessimistic about the capabilities of the jury” to think that
abandonment of Frye’s general acceptance test would result in litigation
“in which befuddled juries are confounded by absurd and irrational
pseudoscientific assertions.”132 Although the Court was anything but clear
about why a reliability inquiry is needed, other than to say that—needed or
not—it is somehow mandated by the language of Rule 702 (which at the
time contained no explicit reference to reliability), the Court seemed fairly
clear in distinguishing jury credulity as a source of its concerns.133 Neither
the opinion in Kumho Tire, nor the advisory committee’s explanation of the
2000 amendment speaks to the contrary. 134
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: Redefining the Bases for Admissibility of Expert Scientific Testimony,
15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1875, 1878-79 (1994).
129
See, e.g., PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO ’S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM
(1991).
130
Haack, supra note 80, at 233.
131
See also Michael S. Jacobs, Testing the Assumptions Underlying the Debate About
Scientific Evidence: A Closer Look at Juror “Incompetence” and Scientific “Objectivity,”
25 CONN . L. REV. 1083, 1086-93 (1993) (maintaining that arguments against juror
competence are often intuitively implausible or logically inconsistent).
132
Daubert, 509 U.S. 595-96 (expressing confidence in the adversary system’s ability to
handle this sort of problem in most cases).
133
See Andrew Taslitz, Daubert’s Guide to the Federal Rules of Evidence: A Not-SoPlain-Meaning Jurisprudence, 32 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 3, 62-65 (1995).
134
One can try to dig further. For example, in an earlier constitutional case, not
involving the interpretation of Rule 702, Justice Blackmun, the author of the majority
opinion in Daubert, made a statement that suggests a concern about jury credulity. See
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 916 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“In a capital case,
the specious testimony of a psychiatrist, colored in the eyes of an impressionable jury by the
inevitable untouchability of a medical specialist’s words, equates with death itself.”). But is
hard to know how seriously to weight such a statement as a proposition warranting the
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In this, the law’s promulgators were right. The available empirical
evidence points to jurors being remarkably conscientious in their work and
not demonstrably less accurate in their inferences than judges.135 More
specifically, so far we have no empirical basis to conclude that jury
credulity in over-crediting expert testimony is a serious or pervasive
problem. After a careful review of the available studies, Neil Vidmar and
Shari Diamond recently concluded simply: “Empirical data do not support
a view that juries are passive, too-credulous, incompetent, and overawed by
the mystique of the expert.” 136
Ironically, if there is distortion in jurors’ evaluation of expertise,
extant empirical studies suggest that the problem is likely to be the opposite
of what is usually assumed. It appears that jurors sometimes undervalue
complex expert testimony of relatively high probative value, especially
when its significance for the disputed issues is not well explained. 137 Based
on such results, one might argue that the reason to exclude expertise of
poor reliability is not because it will be overvalued, but rather because
contrary expertise of much greater reliability offered by the opponent will
be undervalued, leading to an inaccurate weighing of the opposing proofs.
The problems with such an argument, however, are pretty clear: it conflates
admissibility with sufficiency and distorts the latter. It attempts to deal
with a sufficiency problem—that jurors might improperly weigh competing
evidence—by excluding evidence that is not itself subject to demonstrated
overvaluation. And it prevents the jury from combining the evidence of
low reliability with independent evidence, if there is any, that might be
enough in combination rationally to convince the jury. The better response
to the indicated problem, when it occurs, is to explore ways to reduce the
jurors’ undervaluation of the superior expertise by improving their

reliability requirement in Daubert. In any event, we need not base interpretation of
amended Rule 702 on undisclosed concerns of the judges in Daubert.
135
See generally JOHN GUINTHER, T HE JURY IN AMERICA (1988); HARRY KALVEN, JR. &
HANS Z EISEL , T HE AMERICAN JURY (1966).
136
Neil Vidmar & Shari Seidman Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence, 66 BROOK . L.
REV. 1121, 1180 (2001); see also REDMAYNE , supra note 5, at 107, 109-12 (reviewing the
empirical studies and concluding that “the focus on jury competence is somewhat
misplaced”); Jacobs, supra note 131, at 1094-98 (arguing that doubts about juror
competence with respect to scientific evidence fail to take into account the growing body of
empirical evidence to the contrary).
137
See, e.g., Dale A. Nance & Scott B. Morris, An Empirical Assessment of Presentation
Formats for Trace Evidence with a Relatively Large and Quantifiable Random Match
Probability, 42 JURIMETRICS J. 403 (2002) (confirming with summoned jurors the results of
earlier research conducted mostly with students: while a few jurors seem to make
identifiable mistakes that might lead them to overvalue scientific “trace” evidence with a
quantifiable random match probability, the greatly predominant problem seems rather to be
that juries excessively discount the probative value of such evidence).
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comprehension of its significance.138
The foregoing observations are consistent with, but do not entail, the
more general proposition that juries have greater difficulty as the scientific
or technical complexity of the evidence increases. There is some limited
evidence to support such a general propos ition, although the evidence is
subject to various interpretations.139 To be sure, the idea is not particularly
surprising, for it is difficult to imagine a plausible definition or criterion of
“complexity” that would not render the proposition true to some degree, if
not tautologically so. Almost by definition, complex cases are difficult
cases. Consequently, an analogous proposition will be true for any decision
makers, including judges or panels of experts. And even if judges’
veritistic acumen falls off less steeply than juries’ as complexity
increases—which we cannot as yet conclude—that would seem to speak to
the question of the wisdom of jury trials in complex cases, not to the
question of the advisability or criterion of excluding evidence.140
In his present contribution Joseph Sanders tries to bridge this gap,
developing the best argument yet identified for grounding the Rule 702
reliability determination in epistemic paternalism toward the jury. 141
Building on the slender reed of the jury’s asserted difficulties in complex
cases, he concludes that “on balance the empirical research does lend some
support to the paternalistic justification for restrictions on the admissibility
of unreliable expert testimony.”142 As I understand his argument, however,
the most that can be inferred from the available data is that, if judges are
capable of making the necessary discriminations (which we do not know),
then “close scrutiny of testimony [by judges] is potentially most beneficial
in complex cases where peripheral processing [by jurors] is most likely.”143
138

See, e.g., id. (finding that variation in the manner of presenting the random match
probability affects the extent of jury undervaluation of trace evidence relative to Bayesian
norms).
139
See, e.g., Richard O. Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases: Taking Stock After
Twelve Years, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 181-247 (Robert E. Litan ed.,
1993) (reviewing the available evidence and concluding (at p. 235) that “the weight of the
evidence indicates that juries can reach rationally defensible verdicts in complex cases”); cf.
SANDERS, supra note 9, at 193 (“If there is one lesson to be drawn from these cases, one
single overarching problem revealed by the Bendectin litigation, it is that in cases involving
complex scientific evidence juries have a difficult time reaching the truth.”).
140
Even with regard to the choice between bench trial and jury trial, such a showing
would be incomplete. If, for example, juries are much better than judges in relatively
uncomplicated cases, then juries’ reduced acumen in complex cases might still be higher
than judges’. See LEMPERT, supra note 139, at 234-35 (concluding that there is still no
evidence that judges will perform better than juries in complex cases).
141
See Joseph Sanders, The Paternalistic Justification for Restrictions on the
Admissibility of Expert Testimony, 33 SETON HALL L. RE V. 881 (2003).
142
Id. at 938.
143
Id. at 937. “Peripheral processing” refers to the jury’s use of factors such as
credibility cues as opposed to an assessment of the rational strength of the inference
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And Sanders acknowledges that we do not have evidence from which to
conclude that judges are capable of identifying evidence that is “unreliable”
relative to the goal of minimizing erroneous verdicts (or the costs thereof)
due to either (a) jury misunderstanding of admitted expertise or (b) jury
error induced by exclusions.144
This valiant effort, therefore, does not close the argumentative gap.
Because the evidence does not show whether such judicial scrutiny is on
balance beneficial or harmful, even in complex cases, the claim that
judicial scrutiny is “potentially most beneficial” in certain cases is the same
as saying that it is “potentially least harmful” in such cases. In other
words, at best Sanders has shown that if judges are successfully trained to
make good assessments of the degree of reliability and exclude expertise on
paternalistic grounds when they think the evidence has low reliability (a big
“if”), then the expected benefit of such a practice increases as the degree of
complexity of the case increases, but the expected benefit (for all we know)
might not be positive over any identifiable range of complexity. Thus, the
argument necessarily falls short of a justification for a reliability-based
exclusionary practice applied in all cases involving expert testimony.
Until we have more evidence of jury credulity, as well as more
evidence that judges are in fact capable of offsetting such incompetence by
their decisions to exclude expertise, respect for the political significance of
the jury and for those citizens who are called to service on juries dictates
that we should not readily exclude supposed expertise on this ground.
Instead, we should leave this kind of problem to be handled under the proadmissibility standard articulated in Rule 403, as in fact prescribed by the
majority in Daubert.145 Indeed, before excluding evidence on this ground,
courts should at least consider and rule out less drastic remedies such as
judicial comment on the evidence.146
Monitoring Adversarial Presentations. Much more prominent in the
Daubert and Kumho Tire opinions is a concern about regulating the
introduction of expert testimony so that it will properly assist the trier of
fact.147 The question is how excluding proffered expert testimony can be of
assistance, if the concern is not about juror credulity. Obviously, expertise

suggested by the expert. Id. at 909.
144
Id. at 937-38.
145
509 U.S. at 595; see also In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 746-47 (3d
Cir. 1994) (per Becker, J.) (accepting that Daubert altered prior law in the circuit by taking
consideration of the danger of overwhelming or confusing the jury out of the Rule 702
analysis and committing it to the Rule 403 analysis); FOSTER & HUBER, supra note 38, at
207-09 (noting that Rule 403 is the appropriate tool for dealing with problems of jury
credulity).
146
See Friedman, supra note 89, at 1064.
147
See Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 149, 156; Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591, 592, 593.
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that is very unreliable may be excluded under Rule 403 as simply a waste
of time. This is not an insignificant limitation on the use of experts, given
the far-fetched proffers that occasionally find their way into courtrooms.
But the question here is whether we can go further to find exclusionary
principles that are more demanding than this obvious time-saving norm. 148
What is there in expert testimony that might call for such a heightened
burden?
I am inclined to believe that the answer lies in the greater
manipulability of such evidence, as compared to most non-expert
testimony. The supply of non-expert testimony, limited as it is by the
requirement of first-hand or “personal” knowledge,149 tends to be fixed by
the litigated events. Typically, only a small number of persons will have
witnessed the events being litigated. For practical purposes, expert
testimony knows no such limitation. When a matter is thought by counsel
to be amenable to expert assistance, there are often numerous
specializations and hundreds or thousands of practitioners thereof who
might be called to testify. Data can often be gathered and experiments can
sometimes be conducted in anticipation of trial. Put simply, expert
testimony is produced in a way that most non-expert testimony is not,
coaching of lay witnesses notwithstanding. 150 And there are obvious and
powerful distorting and biasing forces at work in this production process,
much of which occurs after the events being litigated and with an eye
toward trial. 151
The implication is that greater judicial management or monitoring of
evidence might be needed in this context in order to prevent adversarial
incentives from undermining the accuracy of trials. To be clear, this
implication derives not so much from a concern that jurors cannot or do not
rationally take these process considerations into account, but rather from
the view that they should not be required to do so when a better alternative
can be found. The next two sections examine possible arguments for
148

I put aside the intensely skeptical suggestion that would exclude all conflicting expert
testimony before the trier of fact because neither a judge nor a jury has the background to
decide between conflicting experts, a suggestion that can only be tied to some sort of court
appointed expert system. See, e.g., Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations
Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 40, 51-56 (1901). The suggestion may have
some merit, but it exceeds the scope of my present inquiry.
149
See FED R. E VID. 602, 701.
150
See RICHARD O. LEMPERT ET AL., A M ODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 1013-16 (3d
ed. 2000).
151
One need not embrace an extreme fact skepticism to see in these phenomena the
ability to undermine verdict accuracy. See REDMAYNE , supra note 5, at 5-35 (discussing
“case construction” using forensic science in criminal cases). To be sure, concerns about
experts for hire being especially prone to distort their testimony are probably exaggerated, at
least in civil cases, given the market mechanisms that will influence experts. See RICHARD
A. POSNER, FRONTIERS IN LEGAL T HEORY 401-04 (2001).
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intervention in the adversarial exchange on reliability grounds, suggesting
how such interventions might be structured to assist the trier of fact.
Marshaling Cognitive Resources. One plausible line of argument
begins with the idea of helping the trier of fact (whether judge or jury) to
focus its attention—its cognitive resources—on the most reliable forms of
expertise offered by each side on a disputed issue. When multiple proffers
of expertise address a single issue, one tool to be considered is to remove
from the trial the least reliable evidence offered by a party on that issue.
Suppose, for example, that a party needs to prove the value of a
vacant parcel of land. The party offers several different forms of expertise
that relate to the question. One is a survey of prices at which twenty vacant
parcels, of identified acreage, within a mile of the subject parcel were sold.
The opponent raises questions about the methodology of the survey. The
proponent also offers the testimony of three experienced realtors who have
visited the subject parcel and made “gestalt” assessments based only on
their visits (and their experience) and not, for example, on the information
contained in the survey of prices. Each “gestalt expert” places the per-acre
value of the disputed land at a figure higher than the average per acre figure
from the survey. The opponent also raises questions about the reliability of
such gestalt assessments. In such a case, it would be plausible, depending
on the details of the challenges raised, for a trial court to conclude that the
survey of prices is substantially more reliable, as a measure of the value of
the disputed parcel, than the gestalt testimony. The court might then assist
the trier of fact by excluding the latter, forcing the parties to focus, before
the jury, on the details of the challenge to the reliability of the survey. 152
How would this be of assistance? If we put aside the possibility of
distortion due to jury credulity, why would not the jury always be better off
with more relevant information rather than less, subject to the limits of
cumulativeness? It may be difficult for lawyers or experts, accustomed in
their reflective moments to an all-things-considered, use-every-piece-ofavailable -information type of decision making, to accept the possibility that
“less is more” in the adjudicative context. Yet there are reasons to
entertain the idea. Decision theory has shown that sometimes basing
decision on only selected features of a decision environment can be as
successful or more successful, and less costly in time and other resources,
152

An alternative resolution might be to insist, as a condition of admissibility, that the
“gestalt” witnesses make less subjective appraisals by incorporating the survey data in the
basis of their opinions. This kind of response is addressed in the following subsection.
Another possibility, of course, is that the gestalt witnesses might be considered to be so
weakly reliable as to make consideration of them a waste of time and inadmissible under
Rule 403. It is, of course, difficult to come up with an example for which the application of
Rule 403 is incontestable, so for present purposes, assume that the gestalt witnesses would
not be properly excluded pursuant to Rule 403.
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than a more nuanced decision scheme that takes all pertinent factors into
account.153 Even restric ting consideration to a single factor can be
remarkably accurate if that factor is the best single factor for the
decision. 154 These findings present at least the possibility of a strategy that
can generate improvements in the accuracy of verdicts as well as a
reduction in the cost of trials. Such a strategy would give concrete
meaning to that portion of the Daubert opinion that rejects the need to have
as complete and wide-ranging debate on the matters addressed in litigation
as is needed in the scientific process. 155
Unfortunately, the efficacy of particular decision heuristics is context
dependent. To work well, a simple decision heuristic must take advantage
of information structures in particular decision environments.156 At this
point, we have no experiments or empirical studies that can establish how
this plays out in the context of adversarial trials. For the time being,
therefore, a trial judge would best approach the problem by placing herself
in the position of the jury and asking whether the challenged expertise is so
unreliable, in comparison to other expertise offered by the same party, that
the judge would ignore the challenged proffer if she were the trier of fact.
This viewpoint takes advantage of any applicable decision heuristics
available to the judge to economize cognitive resources. In jury trials, it
also helps to prevent slipping into a consideration of jury credulity, since it
is unlikely that the judge will consider herself to be subject to irrational
overvaluing of the challenged evidence. This viewpoint is one of
representation: The trial judge represents the jury, whose silence cannot
operate to exclude evidence that its members would consider comparatively
too unreliable to be of use. 157
153

See generally GERD GIGERENZER ET AL., SIMPLE HEURISTICS T HAT M AKE US SMART
(1999).
154
Id. at 73-168 (discussing the “Take the Best” heuristic).
155
Justice Blackmun wrote:
It is true that open debate is an essential part of both legal and scientific
analyses. Yet there are important differences between the quest of truth in
the courtroom and the quest for truth in the laboratory. Scientific
conclusions are subject to perpetual revision. Law, on the other hand, must
resolve disputes finally and quickly. The scientific project is advanced by
broad and wide-ranging consideration of a multitude of hypotheses, for those
that are incorrect will eventually be shown to be so, and that in itself is an
advance. Conjectures that are probably wrong are of little use, however, in
the project of reaching a quick, final, and binding judgment—often of great
importance—about a particular set of events in the past.
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596-97.
156
The successfulness of a heuristic depends on its “ecological rationality,” the domainspecific match between the heuristic and the information environment in which it is
employed. See Gerd Gigerenzer, The Adaptive Toolbox, in BOUNDED RATIONALITY : T HE
ADAPTIVE T OOLBOX 38, 46-48 (Gerd Gigerenzer & Reinhard Selten eds., 2001).
157
Cf. The Best Evidence Principle, supra note 120, at 291 (suggesting a broader use of
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Here, then, is one place where the stricter demands of Daubert,
Kumho Tire, and Rule 702 might be put into effect. As noted above,
conventional wisdom is that the effect of these developments is to place the
burden on the proponent to establish “reliability.”158 Applying this idea
here, if the trial judge concludes that the challenged expertise is discernibly
less reliable than other expertise offered by the proponent, then the burden
would rest on the proponent to convince the judge that it would be a
mistake to ignore the challenged expertise because its consideration will
materially assist the trier of fact to render an appropriate verdict within the
constraints imposed by the process of trial. Doubt on the matter would be
resolved in favor of exclusion, reversing the burden as compared to Rule
403.159 Distinguishing this analysis from that of Rule 403 would help to
maintain the representational viewpoint described earlier.160
Despite this default principle favoring exclusion, an important
limitation of the present analysis is that it presupposes there is expertise of
discernibly superior reliability offered by the proponent of the challenged
evidence. Sometimes no such judgment is possible. For example, returning
to our land appraisal case, suppose the proponent’s experienced realtors
base their otherwise gestalt appraisals on an unusual characteristic of the
parcel not shared by the twenty parcels included in the survey of sale
prices. In such a case, a trial judge might properly conclude that both types
of evidence should be considered by the trier of fact. The important point,
in any event, is that the assessment should proceed not in terms of whether
a particular proffer is sufficiently reliable or reasonably reliable, considered
by itself , but rather whether the proponent’s package of expertise on the
issue is as reliable, and thus as helpful to the jury, as it might be if
narrowed by the exclusio n of some of what is offered. The comparative
nature of the evaluation is crucial. 161
the representative perspective).
158
See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
159
This would reverse the argumentative burden only when items of expertise of
significantly different reliability are involved. If, for example, the opponent’s complaint is
simply that too many witnesses are offered to testify to the same effect, then the burden
would remain on the opponent, under Rule 403, to convince the judge that proffered
witnesses would be cumulative.
160
To provide notice to the proponent and to sharpen the issues, the opponent should
have the initial burden of providing a reason to think that the challenged expertise is less
reliable than other expertise offered by the proponent on the point. But then the proponent
would have to surmount the persuasive hurdle for the challenged expertise to be ruled not
inadmissible on this ground. Fed. R. Evid. 104(a) would govern the determinations, as
indicated in Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592.
161
The demands of this analysis may not be circumvented by a proponent’s gratuitous
inclusion of extremely weak expertise that would otherwise not have been submitted, on the
theory that its exclusion under the analysis suggested here would leave the proponent’s
other evidence untouched. That will not work, since the principle discussed in this section
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There is a further implication, one that will not sit well with those who
see in the reliability requirement a quick route to summary judgment. If
the challenged testimony is the only expertise offered by a party on the
disputed fact, the judge would not be warranted in excluding it, at least not
under the theory posited. For example, in our hypothetical real estate
appraisal case, if the proponent presented only the gestalt witnesses, they
could not be excluded in the interest of marshaling cognitive resources.
The reason for this limitation is that the present rationale of exclusion is to
assist the jury in focusing on the best expertise each party has on the issue.
With no other expertise on the proponent’s side, there is nothing presented
with which to make a comparative reliability assessment except the
expertise, if any, offered by the opponent. To use that as the basis for
comparison would be, for practical purposes, to address the merits of the
case. Consequently, if the party’s only expertise on the matter is to be
excluded, it would have to be done on some other ground, such as to avoid
mistakes due to jury credulity or to avoid wasting the jury’s time with very
unreliable expertise—each of which would require meeting the more
demanding (for the opponent) standard of Rule 403—or to induce the
proponent to present better expertise, about which more follows in the next
section.
It is important, therefore, not to overstate the impact of adopting the
foregoing analysis as compared to a scheme that would dispose of a
separate reliability inquiry under Rule 702 and leave such matters to be
handled under Rule 403. Obviously, some comparatively unreliable expert
testimony could and would be excluded under Rule 403 anyway. Still, the
suggested analysis might effectively, if marginally, narrow the scope of
offered expertise in a way that would assist the trier of fact to focus on the
best expert evidence offered by each side. Whether the limited veritistic
gain to be derived from such a marshaling of cognitive resources is worth
the added complexity in the reliability inquiry is difficult to assess a priori.
I have stated the case for such an exclusionary principle as well as I can.
Nevertheless, I am skeptical that this is the kind of reliability inquiry for
which we are searching.
My skepticism derives from three main considerations. First, relying
(as we must, for the time being) on the trial judge’s intuitions about what
will facilitate cognitively economical decision-making might produce as
much heuristic error as it does veritistic improvement. Judges, after all, are

may be iterated; with the strategically inserted expertise out of the way, the court could
proceed to test the proponent’s next weakest evidence as if the subterfuge had not taken
place. There would be, therefore, no incentive for a proponent to throw in sacrificial junk
expertise, unless of course some judges systematically misapplied the principle suggested
here.
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not immune from cognitive illusions.162 There is, moreover, considerable
controversy among those who study the accuracy of human decisionmaking about the usefulness of commonly employed decision heuristics.163
And, as noted above, none of the extant research speaks directly to the
question of sele ction of evidence, expert or otherwise, in an adversarial trial
setting where admissibility decisions are separated from evaluations of
evidentiary weight. Because heuristics can be relatively successful or not,
depending on the particular decision environment, it is hard to say with any
confidence that significant improvement will result from a practice in
which judges exclude the least reliable expertise that a party offers.
Relatedly, one might question whether it is necessary to exclude
evidence to achieve the contemplated benefits, assuming they are nontrivial. Will not the trier of fact employ its own heuristics, pla cing its
serious attention on the subset of admitted expertise that will allow it to
render a reasonably accurate and prompt verdict? 164 This is possible, and to
the extent that it is true, the exclusion of expertise serves primarily to
streamline trials and potentially improve accuracy by saving the cognitive
resources that would be devoted by the trier of fact to selecting those forms
of expertise that should receive more detailed attention. On the other hand,
what is saved in terms of the jury’s time could be lost in terms of the
judge’s time.165 Perhaps future research will shed light on these matters in
a way that will make the potential benefits less speculative.
The third consideration relates to the workability of the exclusionary
principle and arises primarily from the asymmetry that the proposed
structure would put in place. Suppose, for example, in our hypothetical
property valuation case, that the plaintiff’s gestalt witnesses are excluded
because she has presented more reliable survey evidence as well; the trial
judge believes that the gestalt witnesses will only be distracting. Suppose,
then, that defendant offers its own gestalt witnesses as its only expertise on
162
There is evidence, for example, that judges are subject to heuristic errors such as
anchoring and hindsight bias. See Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 777 (2001) (reporting the results of a study of 167 federal magistrate
judges).
163
Compare Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY : HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel
Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) (presenting a relatively pessimistic assessment), with
GIGERENZER ET AL., supra note 153 (presenting a more optimistic assessment).
164
The evidence that ordinary people actually employ particular “fast and frugal”
heuristics that have been theoretically identified and tested is as yet sket chy. Peter M. Todd,
Fast and Frugal Heuristics for Environmentally Bounded Minds, in BOUNDED
RATIONALITY , supra note 156, at 63-67.
165
As a further factor, it is possible that without judicial assistance in winnowing the
evidence to be considered, the jury might feel obligated to neglect its own common sense in
favor of a searching consideration of every item of evidence admitted, an effort that could
be distracting. But this remains highly conjectural.
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the issue. As indicated above, the present principle of exclusion would not
be available upon plaintiff’s objection, with the consequence that defendant
would be able to introduce expertise with the same or a lesser degree of
reliability as that which was foreclosed to the plaintiff upon defendant’s
objection. Many, including a party in the plaintiff’s situation, will consider
this result unfair. This sense of unfairness, to the extent that it is wellfounded, will be largely attributable to concerns about the way that a jury
will react to the situation. 166 There is a danger that the jury will
(rationally!) draw a negative inference from plaintiff’s failure to present
counter evidence in the form of gestalt witnesses, or something similar
thereto, witnesses who, by the trial court’s admission thereof, have been
seemingly certified as reliable enough to warrant the jury’s
consideration. 167
There are a number of possible solutions to this kind of problem,
including informing the jury that the judge excluded some of plaintiff’s
offered expertise and the reasons therefor, or allowing the plaintiff to use
her gestalt witnesses in rebuttal once the defendant has “opened the door”
to such. But these solutions entail some extension of the jury’s
consideration to the very evidence the exclusion of which was supposed to
streamline the trial. To be sure, this kind of problem will not arise in all
cases affected by the exclusionary principle articulated,168 but its potential
reduces the overall benefit to be derived by addin g the complexity of a test
based on marshaling of cognitive resources.
For the time being, then, the most that Rule 702 should do, in the
name of marshaling cognitive resources, is to reverse the burden of Rule
403 regarding whether a proponent’s evidence is sufficiently reliable as not
to constitute a waste of the tribunal’s time and resources. Upon objection,
the proponent would be required to show that this balance clearly favors
admission. Even if a more discriminating exclusionary structure like that
discussed above is premature, the trial judge under this simpler framework
166

In a bench trial, the plaintiff will have substantial solace in the fact that the trial judge
has already gone on record in ruling survey evidence more reliable than gestalt witnesses.
167
Scholars have discussed the idea that jurors may be misled when they expect to
receive evidence that a party has tried unsuccessfully to introduce. See generally Bruce A.
Green, “The Whole Truth?”: How the Rules of Evidence Make Lawyers Deceitful, 25
LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 699, 699-704 (1992); Stephen Saltzburg, A Special Aspect of
Relevance: Countering Negative Inferences Associated with the Absence of Evidence, 66
CAL . L. REV. 1011 (1978). Empirical evidence confirms that negative inferences from
missing evidence can occur. See, e.g., Bettyruth Walter, The Civil Juror: A Research
Project Sponsored by the Roscoe Pound Foundation, in GUINTHER, supra note 135, at 285,
313; Tina M. Webster et al., Voices from an Empty Chair: The Missing Witness Inference
and the Jury, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 31, 39-41 (1991).
168
The defendant in the example might not attempt to introduce pure gestalt witnesses,
but might instead offer one or more witnesses whose expertise is not discernibly less reliable
than the survey evidence admitted for the plaintiff.
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might at least be sensitive to the importance that the judge as trier of fact
would attribute to the various items of expertise offered by the same
proponent and to any rational heuristics the judge would employ as trier of
fact.
This simplified structure, however, would pose greater risk of the
exclusion of all of a party’s expertise, as its potential reach extends to even
the party’s most reliable expertise. This in turn presents again the risk of
judicial misuse of Rule 702 to exclude expertise when, and just because,
the opposing expertise is more reliable. And it is problematic whether
judges would be able to maintain the distinction between this analysis and
the pro-admissib ility standard that, I have argued, is appropriate when jury
credulity is the expressed concern. It would be easy to slide from a
consideration of what would be useful to the judge (and therefore to the
jury) to what would be useful to the judge but not to the more gullible jury.
Consequently, while this framework might be workable, I remain skeptical.
I would rather leave the matter to the conventional Rule 403 analysis, with
the burden of argument on the opponent of the expertise, until such time as
a more discriminating framework becomes warranted by the empirical
evidence.
Securing Better Evidence. One exclusionary principle remains. Much
more important in articulating a meaningful content for the reliability
requirement of Rule 702, and more likely to result in the exclusion of
proffered expertise, is the idea that evidence may be excluded to encourage
the presentation of better evidence, evidence that is more probative or less
costly for the tribunal, or otherwise presenting a more favorable balance
between the two. This idea is present in a wide variety of rules,169
including Rule 403. 170 Here again, we may ask whether the “produced”
nature of expert testimony requires that a heavier burden be placed on a
proponent thereof than is imposed by Rule 403 in this and other contexts.
The post-Daubert reliability requirement arguably entails an affirmative
answer.
An illustration can be found in the regulation of the use of pretrial
experiments:

169

For example, secondary evidence of the contents of a document is excluded in
preference for the original, FED . R. EVID. 1002. For numerous other examples, see the
articles cited supra note 120.
170
One factor a court should consider in deciding whether to exclude evidence
challenged under Rule 403 is the “availability of other means of proof.” FED . R. EVID. 403
advisory committee’s note. This is amply demonstrated by the decision in United States v.
Old Chief, 519 U.S. 172 (1997), holding that in some circumstances evidence of prior
crimes offered by the government may be excluded in favor of a stipulation to the
conviction when the stipulation involves no less legitimate probative value but less
prejudicial potential than the proffered evidence.
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In passing on the admissibility of pretrial experiments, courts often
assert that the experiment must be “substantially similar” to the
conditions of the litigated event. However, what constitutes substantial
similarity is all but impossible to discern from the case law without
inquiring into the possibility that a better experiment could have been
done. The best explanation of the results in these cases seems to be that
“whenever the marginal benefits of a more refined experiment do not
exceed the marginal costs, and the experiment is probative, the
substantial-similarity requirement should be deemed satisfied.”171

Several distinguished scholars have recognized the pertinence of this kind
of consideration in implementing the reliability requirement for expert
testimony, emphasizing that courts need to be demanding consumers of
expertise, especially those kinds of expertise that find their reason for
existence in the demand for expert testimony. 172 I would go further: this
kind of consideration represents the primary, if not exclusive argument
structure appropria te for the reliability inquiry of Rule 702. For want of a
better alternative structure, the principal question here is whether this
consideration can be elaborated into a workable framework for decision. In
the following paragraphs, I briefly explore the parameters of such a
framework.
The most important consideration, once again, is the viewpoint to be
adopted by the judge when making the decision. The judge should ask
whether a reasonable jury, sensitive to the delays and costs associated with
a demand for more reliable expertise, would express such a preference.
Once again, the judge acts to facilitate good inferences by speaking on
behalf of the silent jury, not to channel the jury’s inferences out of
suspicion of jury credulity. On behalf of the jury, the judge will want the
best evidence that is or should have been reasonably available, with due
regard to the adversarial structure of the trial, in knowledge of which the
trial judge has a distinct comparative advantage relative to the jury. 173
171

Faigman et al., supra note 100, at 654 (footnotes omitted).
See FAIGMAN ET AL ., supra note 4, § 1-3.5.1. The matter was debated in recent issues
of the Case Western Reserve Law Review. See Faigman et al., supra note 100; Edward J.
Imwinkelried, A Final Comment—The Importance of the Procedural Framework, 50 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 669 (2000); Imwinkelried, supra note 77. The important point to be
derived from this exchange is that the better evidence idea need not be taken as entailing
some strict hierarchy of types of evidence, whether expert or otherwise, but can, and in this
context should, involve a context -dependent assessment of what can be gained by excluding
proffered evidence.
See Dale A. Nance, Conditional Probative Value and the
Reconstruction of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 94 M ICH . L. REV. 419, 454-56 (1995)
(emphasizing the importance of this distinction in the context of doctrines supposed to rest
on the concept of conditional relevance).
173
That is part of the reason that it is sub-optimal to leave the question of whether better
evidence is reasonably available to the jury’s evaluation of evidential weight. Of course, the
more important reason not to leave the matter to the jury is that the jury can be assisted by
172
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One very important consequence is the negative implication of the
principle: when contemplated alternative expertise is not discernibly more
reliable, or when such discernibly more reliable expertise is not reasonably
available to the proponent, either because it is impossible to acquire or
because the costs of its acquisition would be disproportionate to the stakes
involved, this principle provides no exclusionary authority. The best that is
reasonably available should be admitted, at least so far as the relia bility
requirement of Rule 702 is concerned. Beyond that, an important limiting
principle again places the better evidence idea within an adversarial
context. Specif ically, when the discernibly more reliable expertise is
reasonably available to the opponent to present if the opponent should
deem it worthwhile, then no exclusion of evidence is warranted; in most
cases adversarial incentives should suffice to provide the necessary
assistance to the jury. 174 Thus, upon a challenge that identifies the
potentially better evidence that should be brought to bear and convinces the
trial judge that such evidence is not reasonably available to the challenger,
the proponent would bear the burden of convincing the trial judge that such
evidence either is not signific antly more reliable or is not reasonably
available to the proponent. Once again, it is this placement of a burden on
the proponent, coupled with the facilitative judicial viewpoint explained
above, that serves to distinguish the reliability inquiry of Rule 702 from the
somewhat similar balancing test of Rule 403.
In order to be more concrete, and to indicate qualifications to the
foregoing general principles, it is necessary to distinguish two contexts in
which an objection might be raised. As a general propos ition, expert
testimony can be divided into two components, each of which might be
subject to a reliability challenge: (a) the non-case-specific information or
general explanatory theory or technique that is to be conveyed or applied—
essentially the matters addressed by Rule 702(1) & (2); and (b) the
application of such information to the specifics of the litigated case, usually
by presenting an opinion—addressed by Rule 702(3).175 When an
objection based on the better evidence idea is raised with regard to the first
component, the issue concerns whether or not to expand the informational
or theoretical resources brought to bear on the case. The potential costs
having the better evidence. See supra note 121.
174
For the unusual case in which the more reliable expertise, although available to the
opponent (thus making exclusion of proponent’s less reliable expertise unwarranted), is not
presented by either side, the trial court retains the option of seeking court-appointed expert
assistance. See FED . R. E VID. 706.
175
In the interests of both accuracy and uniformity, the deference to trial court discretion
mandated by General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 145 (1997), in terms of the
standard of appellate review, should be construed to apply only to the latter, and even in the
latter context, some issues may transcend the particular case and require rulings as a matter
of law that are reviewed de novo. See Saks, supra note 39, at 231-35.
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thereof are greater than when the objection concerns the form or content of
the expert’s opinion. A problem with the latter can be corrected with
relatively little cost by adjusting the expert’s testimony. While the
opponent may be able to induce concessions on cross-examination as to the
weakness of a particular opinion, there is sometimes considerable
inconvenience to the jury, and no compelling need, to require such a
delay. 176 The following subsections consider these two contexts in more
detail.
— Testimonial Form and Content. Current practice is often overly
generous to proponents in allowing opinions on case-specific material
facts, ultimate or not, when those facts are not within the personal
knowledge of the expert. Although Rule 704 rightly swept away the per se
exclusion of opinions on ultimate issues,177 courts have failed adequately to
heed an important caveat to that change:
The abolition of the ultimate issue rule does not lower the bars so as to
admit all opinions. Under Rules 701 and 702, opinions must be helpful
to the trier of fact, and Rule 403 provides for exclusion of evidence
which wastes time. These provisions afford ample assurances against
the admission of opinions which would merely tell the jury what result
to reach . . . .178

Overly generous allowance of opinions on such ultimate issues is a major
contributing cause of many perceived problems in the use of experts.179
Modern developments in forensics theory point the way to
improvements in conventional practice consistent with the better evidence
inquiry. Specifically, it would be better to require an expert, whenever
practicable, to frame testimony in a way that effectively communicates a
likelihood ratio for the case-specific facts to which the expert’s explanatory
theory applies.180 If the data are not available that would allow quantitative
or even qualitative measures of the likelihood ratio, then the expert, again
to the extent practicable, should be limited to providing specialized

176

The same point lies behind the exclusion of lay opinion in favor of more concrete
factual reports. See 1 M CCORMICK ON EVIDENCE , supra note 5, § 11 (characterizing the
modern lay opinion rule as a rule of excusable preference that is enforced notwithstanding
the opportunity of an opponent to develop the more concrete facts on cross-examination).
177
See FED . R E VID. 704 (now prohibiting opinions on ultimate issues only in the context
of testimony regarding the mental state or condition of a criminal defendant).
178
FED . R. EVID. 704 advisory committee’s note.
179
See Risinger, supra note 73, at 767 (citing generous treatment of ultimate issue
opinions as well as liberal rules of evidentiary sufficiency).
180
Of course, the best way to communicate a likelihood ratio, when it can be at least
partly quantified, is a difficult matter. See, e.g., Nance & Morris, supra note 137
(investigating different presentation formats for evidence with a quantifiable random match
frequency); Samuel Lindsey, et al., Communicating Statistical DNA Evidence, 43
JURIMETRICS J. 147 (2003) (investigating additional formats).
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information that the jury can use to reach its own, typically intuitive sense
of the likelihood ratio. 181 Such restriction of testimony recognizes that, for
the expert to give an opinion on an ultimate issue, the expert must
implicitly weigh the other evidence in a case, including evidence that goes
beyond any expert’s asserted expertise.182
It would unduly prolong this paper to explain these positions in detail,
and with the necessary qualifications. It implicates the recurring dilemma
of whether expert testimony should provide appropr iate education for the
jury or, instead, provide simply the occasion for the jury to defer to the
opinions of the more credible expert.183 But at least I can say this: If an
expert’s opinion is rejected under Rule 702 (as distinct from Rule 403) on
the ground that it goes too far beyond what the foundational facts and
principles would seem to warrant, that rejection should not be justified on
the ground that the proffered opinion is “unwarranted,” while a more
conservative opinion is “warranted,” except insofar as this is taken as an
indirect way of saying that the more conservative opinion is better
warranted within the scope of the expertise than the opinion originally
proffered. 184
181
Some such developments are indeed occurring, in areas such as handwriting
identification. See DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., SCIENCE IN THE LAW : FORENSIC SCIENCE
ISSUES § 3-1.4.3 (2002) (discussing post-Kumho cases in which courts have admitted expert
testimony about similarities in handwriting but excluded the expert’s opinion on the identity
of the writer).
182
See Richard Friedman et al., Expert Testimony on Fingerprints: An Internet
Exchange, 43 JURIMETRICS J. 91, 94, 98 (2002) (indicating my arguments regarding this
point in the context of fingerprint evidence). See generally ROBERTSON & VIGNAUX, supra
note 91, § 4.4 (arguing that experts ordinarily should not give opinions on the ultimate issue
or any material fact in a case not directly observed by the expert, but should rather provide
testimony that communicates the strength of the evidence to which their expertise relates by
providing its likelihood ratio).
183
See generally Ronald J. Allen & Joseph Miller, The Common Law Theory of Experts:
Deference or Education?, 87 NW . U. L. REV. 1131 (1993). This, of course, is also a matter
of degree, not a categorical choice. See Allen, supra note 51, at 1160 n.9. Educational
presentations should be preferred over ones that merely invite deference except to the extent
that the nature of the expertise makes this impracticable. See generally D. Michael
Risinger, Preliminary Thoughts on a Functional Taxonomy of Expertise for the Post-Kumho
World, in FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 4, §§ 2-2.2 to 2.3 (expressing preference, ceteris
paribus, for “summarizational” expertise over “translational” expertise).
184
Cf. Imwinkelried, supra note 100, at 44-45 (describing the more aggressive opinion,
prone to a higher error rate, as unsupported by its foundation). The acid test would be
presented by a case in which the more aggressive opinion comes from an unavailable expert
declarant who based his opinion on non-replicable observations and whose opinion is
presented as hearsay not excluded as such. Under the binary approach, an unwarranted
opinion does not become warranted by the declarant’s being unavailable and the test being
non-replicable. Under my comparative preference approach, such hearsay would not be
inadmissible by virtue of the reliability requirement of Rule 702 as adumbrated in this
section. Cf. 1 M CCORMICK ON EVIDENCE , supra note 5, § 18 (arguing that lay opinions from
unavailable hearsay declarants should be exempt from a preference for more concrete facts
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A second, surely less controversial application of preferential
regulation of the form of testimony provides the most plausible argument
for a certain deference to non-legal institutional norms. When an expert
witness asserts, explicitly or implicitly, that the basis for his testimony is a
body of knowledge that meets the standards of some discipline, then it is
only fair to hold the witness to such standards. Thus, a witness who claims
his field is “scientific” may properly be held (in part) to standards of the
scientific community, to the extent they can be identified. This is no small
problem:
A large element of politics drives many ostensibly scientific findings.
The quality of much of the science that is urged on courts is, to put it
mildly, weak. In fact, it is not science at all. Many claims to science
are really assertions of policy wrapped in the guise of science.185

In such contexts, a consideration of scientific standards of reliability is
appropriate, but even here it will only rarely be a binary determination.
Rather, the degree of scientific validity in fact present will matter as part of
the process of comparing the probative value of the offered testimony and
its tendency to mislead with that of a more modest testimonial assertion. 186
And this is true even if, but for such an assertion by the proponent, the
standards of the scientific community are not those that the law should
embrace as pertinent to the litigation. For example, even if the law in a
particular context need not demand the level of certainty associated with
conventional scie ntific standards of statistical significance (e.g., a 95%
confidence level),187 an expert who falsely presents to the jury as working
with knowledge that does meet that standard should ordinarily not be
allowed to attempt in this way to mislead the trier of fact. This, however,
also explains why a more modest claim by the expert witness might
rationally lead to admission of the testimony. 188 The point is not to exclude
expertise just because it is not scientifically sound, whatever that may
mean, but rather to assure that the testimony is as helpful to the trier of fact
as it can be, whether the testimony is commonly regarded as scientific or
not.
Attributing such significance to the expert’s assertions is reasonably

that would apply if the declarant testified).
185
FAIGMAN, supra note 46, at 71; see also FOSTER & HUBER, supra note 38, at 209-24
(illustrating rhetorical strategies used by parties and their experts in an effort to misrepresent
the available scientific knowledge).
186
Reference to a tendency to mislead does not mean that we have moved back into the
realm of jury credulity as the grounds of exclusion. The concern here is with the attempt to
mislead. There is no need to countenance such attempts, even if they are only rarely or
never successful. See The Best Evidence Principle, supra note 120, at 291-92.
187
See supra note 51.
188
See FAIGMAN, supra note 46, at 77.
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compatible with both Daubert and Kumho Tire.189 The opinion in Daubert
emphasized somewhat ambiguously that its deference to norms of scientific
validity was premised on the “nature of the expertise offered” in that
case,190 and stated its holding only in the context in which a trial judge is
“[f]aced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony.”191 And the concern
expressed in Kumho Tire, that the existence of a reliability requirement not
depend on the category at issue, is not seriously implicated in relying on
the expert’s assertions. It is one thing to require trial judges to categorize
all expertise as scientific or non-scientific, independent of the witness’s
claims;192 it is another to hold the expert to the standards that the expert
asserts underlies the testimony. Furthermore, a witness cannot escape all
reliability scrutiny just by disclaiming any scientific or other
methodological basis.193 Regardless of assertions, such expertise would
have to satisfy the reliability requirements described in the following
paragraphs.
—Testimonial Bases. With regard to the general data, techniques, and
theories brought to bear by the expert—the issues addressed by Rule 702(1)
& (2)—in a very real sense the question is not about excluding anything; it
is about including something. That is, exclusion of proffered expertise,
under this prong of the analysis, would have the purpose of expressing a
preference for the proponent to expand the data considered by the court, or
to include an additional, more reliable technique, and so forth. Importantly,
once that additional information is presented, if it is, the exclusionary
principle here expressed loses its point, and the originally challenged
testimony, if not inherently altered by the addition, may be admissible.194
For example, if a civil plaintiff in a toxic tort case offers structure-activity
189

The idea of invoking the deferential form of the Daubert inquiry only in situations in
which the expert asserts a scientific basis has been “in the air” at conferences, but I am
unable to attribute the idea to its originator. It would appear to be a position taken in print
by Professor Michael Saks. See Saks, supra note 39, at 237-38 (“The particular regime for
scrutinizing ‘scientific expert testimony’ detailed in Daubert emerged because that was the
type of asserted expertise before the Court.”) (emphasis supplied).
190
509 U.S. at 590 n.8.
191
Id. at 592. The ambiguity is that the Court might mean either (1) that the prop onent
happened to offer evidence that the Court regards as scientific, or (2) that the proponent
happened to offer evidence as scientific.
192
See Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 151 (“We do not believe that Rule 702 creates a
schematism that segregates expertise by type while mapping certain kinds of questions to
certain kinds of experts.”)
193
This was a dangerous trend in the wake of Daubert and before Kumho Tire. See id. at
237.
194
While this may seem counterintuitive, it is actually a familiar admissibility structure.
Cf. 4 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE , EVIDENCE IN T RIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1190 (Chadbourn rev.
1972) (noting that preference for original under original document rule is exhausted by
introduction of original, so that copy may then be admitted, even to prove contents of the
document, subject only to other rules).
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and in vitro studies, and the court is considering excluding the plaintiff’s
evidence in order to express a preference for epidemiological evidence of
human teratogenicity, there would then be no point in excluding the
challenged evidence under the present analysis if the indication is that such
preferred evidence will be introduced, whether by plaintiff or defendant.195
When it is not clear to the court that the preferred evidence has been
or will be presented without excluding that which is proffered, exclusion is
appropriate on this theory only when more reliable expertise is (a)
reasonably available to the proponent, and (b) not reasonably available to
the opponent. As gross generalizations, such a test will place greater
demands on the prosecution than on the accused in criminal cases, and it
will place greater demands on powerful civil defendants than on
impecunious civil plaintiffs. The question of the resources that a party can
bring to bear on improving expertise is thus of crucial importance, rather
than the question of the burden of proof against which that party is
operating, although the two are not of course totally unrelated. I consider
imprecise, therefore, maxims that would vary the level of judicial scrutiny
according to the burden of proof borne by the proponent.196 The latter
principle also tempts us , once again, to conflate admissibility with
sufficiency.
The indicated assessments of availability should not exalt form over
substance. A seemingly impecunious civil plaintiff may be associated with
a resourceful repeat player, such as a subrogating insurance company or a
well-heeled personal injury firm. These facts should matter in the trial
court’s assessment. Nevertheless, it would not be implausible to create one
categorical privilege against the operation of this principle, a privilege
protecting the accused in a criminal case.197 Even in the unusual case in
195

I find problematic, therefore, those cases that exclude plaintiff’s toxicology evidence
just because substantial contrary epidemiological evidence is present. See FAIGMAN ET AL.,
supra note 4, § 7-1.3.1[1], at 290. Once again, this is a sufficiency question, pure and
simple, and should be handled as such. See id. § 8-1.6.6. To be sure, exclusion on grounds
other than the reliability requirement of Rule 702, including the ground that the toxicology
evidence is simply a waste of time, might be warranted, provided of course such an
exclusionary rationale is not a sufficiency determination in disguise. See id. § 8-1.6.5.
When the issue is whether to exclude an expert’s opinion in order to express a preference for
more reliable background information in the foundation of the opinion, then the exclusion
also implicates the previous discussion of exercising control over the testimonial form and
content, at least insofar as the expert might be required to opine based on the augmented
information base. In many cases, this can be done adequately on cross-examination, and
there is then no need to exclude the opinion originally proffered.
196
“All things being equal, the higher the standard of proof applicable to the issue upon
which the expertise is offered, the higher the required threshold dependability should be.”
Risinger, supra note 183, § 2-4.0, at 89.
197
This would mute concerns over the unfairness of strict application of Daubert to
evidence offered by the accused. See Christopher Slobogin, The Structure of Expertise in
Criminal Cases, 34 SETON HALL L. RE V. 105 (2003) (arguing that the “positivist push” of
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which the accused is wealthy, it may be unwise to allow courts to apply a
nominally symmetrical admissibility principle to exclude relevant expertise
offered by the accused, in view of the apparent tendency of the courts to
apply such principles more strictly to the accused than to the prosecution.198
Such a privilege would also obviate concerns over the constitutionality of
excluding expertise offered by the accused.199 Somewhat more debata bly,
but of more practical importance, the accused might be privileged not to
have to show, as a condition of excluding the prosecution’s expertise on
this theory, that the more reliable expertise cannot reasonably be presented
by the accused.
Three further refinements are worth attention here. First, constraints
on the development of more reliable expertise may be non-monetary.
Ethical and legal restrictions on human experimentation are obvious
constraints that do more than raise the monetary costs of developing new
information. 200 The point may have surprisingly broad implications. Even
established medical practices may have evolved over time or been
articulated in consensus-based “practice guidelines” without being
subjected to rigorous empirical testing. 201 In recent years this has helped to
spawn a movement for “evidence-based medicine,” 202 in some respects the
medical profession’s version of Daubert.203
In contemplating an
exclusionary response under the principle of demanding better evidence,
courts may encounter ethical or legal restrictions on human
experimentation, including the requirement of informed consent, that limit

Daubert, if taken seriously, will unfairly disadvantage the accused, in part because of
resource disparities).
198
See D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of
Certainty Being Left on the Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99 (2000) (reporting results of an
empirical analysis of decisions).
199
Cf. United States v. Scheffler, 523 U.S. 303 (1998) (rejecting, over one dissent, a
constitutional argument under the Compulsory Process Clause that accused should be
privileged to introduce favorable polygraph evidence in the face of an exp licit exclusionary
rule in the Military Rules of Evidence).
200
See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 4, § 7-2.3.2, at 313 (noting ethical limitations on the
use of randomized controlled trials in epidemiology).
201
See, e.g., Fiona Godlee, Getting Evidence Into Practice, 317 BRIT. M ED . J. 6 (1998)
(“[M]any of the questions that arise in daily clinical practice remain unaddressed by well
designed research.”); Arnold J. Rosoff, Evidence-Based Medicine and the Law: The Courts
Confront Clinical Practice Guidelines, 26 J. HEALTH POL ., POL ’Y & L. 327, 328-29 (2001)
(noting that even some clinical practice guidelines have not been developed using evidencebased medicine).
202
See generally D.L. SACKETT ET AL., EVIDENCE -BASED M EDICINE: HOW TO PRACTICE
AND T EACH EBM (2d ed. 2000).
203
See Daniel W. Shuman, Expertise in Law, Medicine, and Health Care, 26 J. HEALTH
POL ., POL ’Y & L. 267, 287 (2001) (“Science-based medical evidence and the Daubert trilogy
reflect unorchestrated parallel movements in medicine and law about how to assess
expertise critically.”).
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the ability of researchers to test the efficacy of now conventional practices
or the causal assumptions on which they were originally based. 204
Considerations such as these will sometimes warrant the admission of
expertise that otherwise might fail the reliability test, especially in regard to
establishing the standard of care in professional malpractice.205 In any
event, the “cost” consideration involved in making such determinations is,
always in theory and often in practice, a richly textured normative
consideration.
The second refinement to be noted is that greater reliability might be
unavailable to a party within the context of a particular case (even
considering the matter retroactively from the beginning of the litigation),
yet reasonably available to that party within the context of repeated
litigation of the same or similar issue. At the outer reaches of the better
evidence idea, repeat players, such as the state in regard to forensic science
techniques, may plausibly be considered in regard to the long run of cases,
rather than based on what is reasonably available in the short run to address
a particular case.206 In such contexts, it would be important that the
prosecution, or other repeat player, be given reasonable notice of the
courts’ intention to reject expertise. Such notice need not come in the form
of the rejection of expertise offered in a particular case, however, for a
court might admit expertise while at the same time serving warning that in
the future such expertise will be rejected for want of sufficient reliability.
The third refinement once again takes account of the adversarial
nature of the proceedings. Suppose that the prosecution offers questioned
document examiner testimony to identify the accused as the writer of a
ransom note, and assume that the court holds this testimony inadmissible
because (1) error rates have not been established for this expert or even for

204
In addition to problems of informed consent, there is significant controversy over the
proper restrictions on the use of placebo-controlled experiments, which would be necessary
to test the efficacy of conventional practices. See, e.g., Sharona Hoffman, The Use of
Placebos in Clinical Trials: Responsible Research or Unethical Practice?, 33 CONN . L.
REV. 449, 451 (2001) (noting that the principle of beneficence militates against the inclusion
of placebos in clinical trials under most if not all circumstances in which a standard therapy
exists, and arguing for a compromise position significantly limiting the use of placebocontrolled studies). But see ROBERT J. LEVINE , T HE ETHICS AND REGULATION OF CLINICAL
RESEARCH 4-5 (2d ed. 1986) (noting that even established practices may be, and in
appropriate cases should be, considered “unvalidated” for purposes of applying ethical and
legal principles controlling experimentation, thus muting the principle of beneficence).
205
This, of course, assumes that courts will come around to applying the reliability
requirement of Daubert/Kumho to conventional medical testimony. See Shuman, supra
note 203, at 277-82 (observing that Daubert has been largely ignored in civil cases outside
the contexts of toxic torts and products liability). It is difficult to see how jurisdictions
controlled by the 2000 amendment of Rule 702 can avoid this extension much longer.
206
See REDMAYNE , supra note 5, at 126 (emphasizing the peculiar force of the best
evidence principle when applied to the state in a criminal case).
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the average comparably-trained expert, (2) tests to determine such error
rates could be easily developed by or at the insistence of the state, and (3)
such tests could not be practically undertaken by the accused in this case.
The state proceeds without this expertise, because it cannot conduct the
tests (or cause other agencies to do so) within the time frame of the present
trial. Suppose, then, that the accused offers exactly the same kind of
handwriting identification testimony, except of course that it is exonerative.
Applying the principles as announced above, the trial judge concludes that
the latter testimony should not be excluded because the better expertise
(that which is accompanied by error rate information) cannot be reasonably
obtained by the accused or because the accused is privileged not to have to
make a showing of unavailability. This would present a problem. The
accused would be allowed to present evidence of the same degree of
reliability as that which the prosecution is precluded from introducing.
That might seem unfair to the state, even if adequate notice of the court’s
concern was given to the state in previous decisions.
Is this a serious problem? At one level, the answer might be, “No.” If
the goal of the admissibility structure were solely to induce improvements
in the quality of expertise, then one can hardly imagine a better system.
Faced with the prospect that the accused will be able to provide exonerative
testimony while the prosecution will be unable to present inculpatory
testimony from the same discipline, the state will have a very powerful
incentive—stronger than if neither side or both sides could use such
evidence—to investigate further the reliability of that form of expertise in
order to assure either that the prosecution could introduce such evidence or
that the defense could not.207 However, the goal is not to improve future
reliability at any cost; accuracy in the present case ought not be completely
subordinated to accuracy in future cases. A balance must be struck, and I
suggest a compromise that would allow the prosecution, in the hypothetical
described above, to offer rebuttal evidence using expert testimony of the
same type, in this case handwriting identification testimony that is not
significantly less reliable than that which the accused has introduced. 208
The accused would, however, retain the option to foreclose this line of
207
The latter would be possible if, for example, the research showed facts rendering the
defense testimony inadmissible under Rule 403 or conditionally admissible if the defense
expert provides a more conservative opinion, as explained above.
208
The problem is similar to, but not the same as, the problem discussed above in
connection with the previously considered principle for marshaling cognitive resources. See
supra notes 152-68 and accompanying text. The similarity lies in the risk of negative
inferences by the jury from a party’s (here, the prosecution’s) failure to introduce evidence
the jury would expect to receive. The main differences lie in the greater need for a
remedy—because here the prosecution has no other expertise on the issue—and in the fact
that a remedy is available in the present context that does not so dramatically undermine the
purpose of the exclusion.
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inquiry by not offering such testimony. 209 The same rebuttal structure
would be employed in civil cases when a similar asymmetry of evidentiary
options occurs. Such a balance would retain significant pressure for the
long-run improvement of the reliability of under-validated expertise
without creating unfairness and potentially distorted interim verdicts.210
The foregoing considerations obviously do not exhaust the kinds of
issues that would need to be addressed. I have tried only to present a
framework that can be developed, refined, or modified as further thought
on the matter proceeds. Many of the details cannot be perfectly anticipated
and would need to be addressed in the traditional common-law manner as
particular issues arise.211 But the underlying theme should be clear enough:
courts should not exclude expert testimony (under Rule 702) just because it
is “unreliable” simpliciter, but only because (and when) by doing so, the
reliability of the expert testimony, in this or future cases, can be noticeably
improved. 212
209
The structure would parallel that used for character evidence, in which the accused
has the option of opening the door to character evidence with the understanding that the
prosecution can reply in kind. See FED . R. E VID. 404(a)(1), (2).
210
The degree of pressure can be adjusted, moreover, by choices about the timing of the
contemplated “rebuttal.” For example, we can choose whether to allow the prosecution to
offer the undervalidated handwriting expertise only at the formal rebuttal stage, which
would mean the prosecution would have to survive a motion to dismiss at the end of its
case-in-chief without the benefit of that testimony, or else to require the defense to indicate
its intention to use its handwriting expertise and then allow the prosecution to anticipate that
use by introducing its undervalidated experts in its case-in-chief. I am inclined to believe
the former solution gives a better balance, but others may disagree.
211
Professor Imwinkelried sees in the resolution of these issues a multiplication of
preliminary issues affecting admissibility, and he fears that this will operate to the
disadvantage of financially weaker parties. See Imwinkelried, supra note 98, at 283-85.
The issues are complex, to be sure, but this is not substantially more so under my proposed
interpretations than under current practice. Reliability determinations, using the Daubert
factors and similar factors articulated after Daubert, already are complicated matters. How
could they be otherwise? My framework adds certain factors to be considered, to be sure,
but if my argument—that some such proposal must be developed to make reliability
standards coherent—is correct, then any marginal increase in complexity is in the nature of
the beast; conceptually incoherent reliability determinations certainly cannot be justified on
the ground that they are simpler to state. If the costs of complexity are not worth the gains
from a coherent reliability inquiry, then the answer lies in rejecting the reliability
requirement itself.
212
This, it will be noticed, is a necessary condition for exclusion, not a sufficient
condition. It might be the case, for example, that excluding expertise offered by a party
without significant economic or political power, such as a criminal defendant or
impecunious civil plaintiff, would cause the community of experts, as repeat players
themselves, to test their methods so as to improve their degree of reliability in a cost
justified manner. Professor Faigman seems to believe that this would be enough to warrant
exclusion, without regard to the resources of the proponent. See Faigman, supra note 68, at
261-64. I am indebted to him for pressing me on this point and thus requiring me to
articulate the reason for my focus on party resources rather than expert-community
resources. The reason is this: To use the present litigant solely as a means to the end of
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IV. CONCLUSION
The general thrust of Daubert, that the judiciary should take a more
active role in monitoring the use of expertise in court, may be entirely
sound. If so, however, it might have been better had the law of expert
testimony not taken the path it has. Perhaps the demand for reliability, as a
condition of admissibility, is a conceptually poor substitute for judges
taking more seriously their responsibility to grant directed verdicts and
summary judgments when expert testimony, taken in conjunction with nonexpert evidence relating to the same essential element of a cause of action
or defense, is too weak to support a rational verdict favorable to its
proponent.213 Personally, I am inclined to think so, at least so long as the
burden of production is rightly understood. 214
Be that as it may, Daubert, Kumho Tire, and amended Rule 702 have
marked out a different, rockier conceptual path, and at least for the time
being, we must try to make the most of it. The use of a dichotomous
concept of reliability, whether or not founded on deference to a non-legal
discipline, simply poses too many problems. These problems, in turn,
encourage an epistemically invasive use of admissibility to monitor the
weight of the evidence. It is time to turn away from that kind of thinking
and try another tack, one that draws on more manageable comparative
reliability assessments that build on a gradational concept of reliability.
In this paper I have argued that if we set aside the generally
unfounded concerns about juror credulity, we can still fashion criteria of
admissibility under Rule 702 that refle ct the gatekeeping mandate of the
post-Daubert regime while employing such a comparative assessment
methodology. These criteria could assist the trier of fact by (1) marshaling
its cognitive resources around the relatively reliable forms of expertise each
party offers, and/or (2) providing appropriate incentives for parties to
discover, develop, or present more reliable expertise than would otherwise

improving expertise offered in subsequent trials involving other parties is unfair, a violation
of a categorical imperative never to use others solely as means to an end. For the litigant
who must take what he or she finds in terms of the reliability of available expertise, Rule
702 should allow the litigant to use the best of what is available. If such use of available
expertise is considered problematic nonetheless, it would seem more properly to be the
subject of direct regulation of the expert community, which would invoke a different
justificatory framework with its own set of issues. On the other hand, to the extent that a
litigant bears some responsibility for the current level of reliability of the challenged
expertise—a responsibility arising out of access to or creation of data, investigative
economies of scale, or political power—it is fair to deprive the litigant of expertise that does
not attain the degree of reliability that those resources make possible and desirable, given
the nature of the case.
213
Professor Friedman argues forcefully along these lines. See Friedman, supra note 89.
214
See Nance, supra note 121 (arguing that the burden of production should be
understood to embrace an obligation to assure that evidence is reasonably complete).
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be presented in court. While the case for the former is still relatively weak
and undeveloped, the case for the latter is stronger. Careful use of the
latter, if not also the former, could effect a change for the better, both in
terms of the substance of the admissibility rulings and in terms of the
consistency and coherence of those rulings.

